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THE STOCK EXCHANGE AS A FIRM: THE
EMERGENCE OF CLOSE SUBSTITUTES FOR





Although the importance of well-developed secondary trading
markets for securities is widely known,1 the economic function of
stock exchanges is one of the most poorly understood elements of
modem economic life. This lack of understanding of the nature and
purposes of organized stock exchanges became particularly obvious
in the wake of the stock market crash of October, 1987. On that
day, the DowJones Industrial Average of New York Stock Exchange
listed securities dropped 508 points, and the New York Stock Ex-
change ("NYSE") lost $1 trillion in value.2 Similar declines affected
other world markets, including the Tokyo Stock Exchange
("TSE").3 In the wake of this rapid decline in value, the New York
Stock Exchange was singled out for blame as though the price at
which securities are bought and sold on that market, unlike others,
was determined by the market participants themselves, rather than
by more fundamental economic factors, such as new information
about the firms whose securities are being bought and sold, or
changes in macroeconomic conditions.4
t Professor of Law, The University of Chicago.
tt Associate Professor of Law, The University of Tokyo; Visiting Professor of Law,
University of Chicago, Fall 1989.
We thank Morris Mendelson and Roberta Romano for their helpful comments and
suggestions. An earlier version of this paper was presented at a seminar at the Univer-
sity of Tokyo. We thank the participants at that workshop, as well as the participants in
the law and economics workshops at the University of California, Berkeley, and at the
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I The purpose of a well-developed secondary market is to provide liquidity for
investors. See Jonathan R. Macey & David D. Haddock, Shirking at the SEC: The Failure of
the National Market System, 1985 U. ILL. L. REv. 315, 325-27.
2 REPORT OF THE PESIDETrIAL TASK FORCE ON MARKET MECHANISMS 1 (1988)
[hereinafter BRADY REPORT].
3 1989 TOKYO STOCK EXCHANGE FACT BOOK 84 [hereinafter TSE FACT BOOK].
4 Jayne Levin, Market Reform: Picking up the Pieces-and the Pace, INVESTMENT DE.L-
ERS DIG., June 5, 1989, at 14 (describing the various reform proposals and regulatory
initiatives offered in Congress and by special "blue ribbon" panels formed to study the
October market break); see also Norman S. Poser, Repairing The Big Board, N.Y. Times,
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A central premise of this Article is that market "reform" in the
form of new regulation is doomed to failure until the economic
functions of organized exchanges are better understood. Of partic-
ular importance are the mechanisms by which prices are set within
the exchanges, and the degree of competition that exchanges face
for the various services they offer. Thus the purpose of this Article
is to articulate the economic underpinnings of organized stock
exchanges.
Against this theoretical background we evaluate the rules that
govern secondary trading on the NYSE and the TSE. While the fo-
cus of this Article is on these two exchanges, we believe much of the
analysis can be generalized to provide insights as to the operation of
other exchanges, and to the operation of the over-the-counter mar-
kets as well.5
We show that the organized stock exchanges operate in exceed-
ingly competitive environments. Once the nature of the services
provided by the exchanges is fully understood, it becomes clear that
a variety of market devices that previously seemed wholly unrelated
to the exchanges are in fact close substitutes for those offered by the
Dec. 16, 1987, at A35, col. 1; Steve Swartz, LaBranche, Lawrence O'Donnell & Co. To Surren-
der 3 Market Making Roles, Wall St.J., Feb. 23, 1988, at 58, col. 5; Steve Swartz, Spear Leeds
Ends Market-Making Roleforj.P. Morgan in Wake of Investigation, Wall St.J.,Jan. 8, 1988, at
9, col. 1 (specialists' activity related to market collapse); see generally TSE FAcT BOOK,
supra note 3 (promoting the Tokyo Exchange).
5 In this Article we define a stock exchange as a body that provides a centralized
forum in which stock trades are undertaken. Such a forum provides the means by which
the market prices of stocks can be openly established and through which price informa-
tion can be produced and disseminated to users of the market.
The term over-the-counter market traditionally has referred to trading done off the
floor of an organized stock exchange. As technology has developed, the distinction be-
tween the over-the-counter securities markets and the organized stock exchanges has
become blurred. In the United States, the over-the-counter market increasingly has
come to resemble the securities exchanges, as prices of securities are quoted and traded
on an electronically linked automated quotation and trading system called the "NAS-
DAQ:' system. NASDAQ is an abbreviation for National Association of Securities Deal-
ers Automated Quotations, a computerized trading network organized by the National
Association of Securities Dealers. See To LIsT OR NOT TO LIST, EUROMONEY & CORPO-
RATE FINANCE 43 (N. Osborne ed.) (Supp. Nov. 1986); James L. Hamilton, Marketplace
Organization and Marketability: NASDAQ, The Stock Exchange, and The National Market System,
33J. FIN. 487 (1978). But see Norman S. Poser, Restructuring the Stock Markets: A Critical
Look at the SEC's National Market System, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 883, 895 (1981) (an important
difference between the stock exchanges and the over-the-counter markets is that ex-
changes provide a central place for trading where "all customers' buy and sell orders
meet and the highest buy order is matched against the lowest sell order in an auction-
type process").
As computer linkages have made U.S. over-the-counter and stock exchanges in-
creasingly similar, it is no surprise that the chairman of a major Australian stock ex-
change predicted that exchange trading floors would be phased out by the end of the
century. See THE WORLD'S TRADERS GET OFF THE FLOOR 154 (P. Fallon ed. May 1985)
(quoting James Bain of the Sydney Stock Exchange).
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exchange. Thus we show the exchanges face significant competition
for the services they offer. While we find that the NYSE faces con-
siderably more competition for listings of American firms than the
TSE does for listings ofJapanese firms, both exchanges operate in a
competitive environment and market themselves accordingly.
While many observers seem to view stock exchanges as philan-
thropic institutions organized to act in the public interest, this is not
the case. Stock exchanges are self-interested economic organiza-
tions.6 These firms supply services to listing companies in exchange
for fees. The fees come in the form of an initial listing fee and an
annual fee, which can be as high as $500,000 on the NYSE, and even
higher on the TSE.7 Firms are not required to have their shares
listed on an exchange. Nonetheless, firms with publicly traded stock
have shown a strong interest in having their shares traded on an
exchange. Consequently, it stands to reason that the exchanges
must be offering something of value in order to command such high
fees.
We show that the product offered by organized securities ex-
changes, which is called a "listing," can be unbundled into four
component parts. Specifically, organized exchanges provide listing
6 The NYSE is organized as a for profit company. The TSE was organized as a for
profit company until the occupation by Allied forces after World War II, when it was
reorganized as a non-profit membership organization. See A PROFILE OF THE TOKYO
STOCK EXCHANGE: HISTORY, STRUCTURE AND A VARIETY OF SERVICES 2 (undated
monograph).
7 On the NYSE, the initial listing fee is $36,800, and the annual fee ranges from a
minimum of $14,740 to a maximum of $500,000. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, LISTING
STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES FOR DOMESTIC CORPORATIONS [hereinafter NYSE LISTING
STANDARDS]. The TSE "requires listed companies to shoulder part of various costs for
the operation of its business, including the supervision of listed securities, in the form of
listing fees." TSE FACT BOOK, supra note 3, at 37. In addition to an original listing fee of
5 million yen plus .045 yen per share, annual listing fees on the TSE begin at 300,000
yen (about $2100.00) for the first 10 million of a firm's shares and increase incre-
mentally according to the following formula:
Out of the number of shares listed:
(1) 300,000 yen for 10 million shares or less;
(2) 26,000 yen for each 2 million shares or fraction thereof in excess of
10 million shares to 40 million shares;
(3) 26,000 yen for each 4 million shares or fraction therefor in excess of
40 million shares to 120 million shares;
(4) 26,000 yen for each 10 million shares or fraction thereof in excess of
120 million shares to 200 million shares;
(5) 26,000 yen for each 100 million shares or fraction thereof in excess
of 200 million shares to I billion shares;
(6) 26,000 yen for each 200 million shares or fraction thereof in excess
of I billion shares to 2 billion shares;
(7) 26,000 yen for each 400 million shares or fraction thereof in excess
of 2 billion shares.
(For foreign issuers, the listing fee is one-half of the amount derived by
the formula above.)
I d at 40-41.
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companies with: (1) liquidity, (2) monitoring of exchange trading,
(3) standard form, off-the-rack rules to reduce transactions costs,
and (4) a signalling function that serves to inform investors that the
issuing companies' stock is of high quality. In Part I of this Article
we discuss each of these attributes. We show that, while organized
exchanges were historically the sole providers of these services, over
time a wide variety of close substitutes has developed. While these
close substitutes generally are not exchanges themselves, they nev-
ertheless directly compete with the organized exchanges. Due to
the emergence of these substitutes, it no longer is appropriate to
view the organized exchanges as monopolies. Instead, they should
be perceived and regulated as members of a highly competitive
industry.
In Part II of the Article we apply the arguments made in Part I
to the NYSE. We find that regulatory initiatives taken in the wake of
the market decline of October, 1987 completely misperceived the
modem economic reality under which that Exchange is operating.
In particular, these initiatives assumed that the NYSE actually pro-
vides liquidity to listed firms. In fact, the NYSE merely serves as a
conduit through which trading by broker-dealers, institutional in-
vestors, and others provide liquidity in an increasingly automated
market environment. We also find that current regulations, which
require exchange specialists to maintain fair and orderly markets,
also misperceive the economic role played by exchanges.
In Part III of the Article we apply the arguments made in Part I
to the TSE. We find that the internal organization and regulatory
structure of that Exchange are better suited to modem trading prac-
tices and investor needs. In particular, unlike the specialists on the
NYSE, the saitori members of the TSE, who are roughly analogous
to exchange specialists on the NYSE, are only obliged to match or-
ders, and are prohibited from trading on their own account.8
Rather, consistent with economic reality, investors and other market
participants expect that secondary market liquidity on the TSE will
be provided as a by-product of the rivalrous competition that exists
among the broker-dealers with trading privileges on the exchange.
Thus, we find that in Tokyo the regulatory environment more accu-
rately reflects economic reality than does the situation in the United
States.
I
THE STOCK EXCHANGE AS A FIRM
The most widely understood function of an organized exchange
8 See infra text accompanying notes 160-66.
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is to provide liquidity for listing firms. 9 In the past, securities ex-
changes were the dominant forum for securities trading. Although
over-the-counter markets have existed for a long time, communica-
tions technology was too primitive to allow securities transactions to
take place without face to face contact among traders. 10 More re-
cently, however, securities transactions can take place in a variety of
ways that do not require that buyers and sellers physically meet.11
While these technological developments have not rendered the or-
ganized exchanges obsolete by any means, they have allowed for the
emergence of over-the-counter and other computer-linked securi-
ties markets as substitute providers of liquidity.12 These markets,
particularly the National Association of Securities Dealers Auto-
mated Quotations ("NASDAQ'), have deprived the exchanges of
9 See generally ROBERT W. HAMILTON, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN BUSINESS 417
(1989); S. ROBBINS, THE SECURITIES MARKETS: OPERATIONS AND ISSUES 33 (1966).
10 Macey & Haddock, supra note 1, at 317.
11 NASDAQ displays updated price quotations on a real time basis on terminals in
subscribers' offices. There are three levels of terminals with varying information. Level
III terminals are used by market makers who can change or cancel any bid or offer for
any stock in which he makes a market. All current bids and offers entered by the market
makers are shown at this level. Level II terminals, used by brokers and dealers who do
not act as market makers, provide the same information as Level III terminals, but do
not allow inputing of bids and offers. Level I terminals, used by salespeople of broker-
age firms, provide only an approximate idea of the price at which a security can be
bought or sold. When a brokerage firm receives an order from a customer to buy (or
sell) a stock that is quoted on the NASDAQsystem, it checks the Level I or II screen to
ascertain the market maker quoting the best offer (or bid). The firm then telephones the
market maker and executes the transaction with him. Thus, the brokerage firm will
either act as an agent for its customer and charge a commission, or as a principal and
purchase the security for its own account and immediately resell at a price markup to the
customer who placed the order. NATIONAL AsS'N OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC., NAS-
DAQ AND THE OTC MARKET 12-22 (1976) [hereinafter NASDAQ AND THE OTC MAR-
KET].
"Instinet," owned by Reuters, is a similar system:
Instinet is a real-time, international computerised [sic] market access, in-
formation and trading system for [stocks]. It is designed primarily for
large institutional users and professional [stock] traders. Instinet users
may be located anywhere in the world. . . . All US listed and NAS-
DAQ/NMS [stocks], certain ADRs and UK alpha stocks can be traded on
Instinet .... Orders are put directly into the Instinet electronic order
book .... [Order] matching is automatic if bid and offer prices agree.
Otherwise, matching can be achieved by anonymous negotiation via the
screen.
TOUCHE Ross MANAGEMENT CONSULTANTS, MAINTAINING A CENTRAL EQUITIES MARKET 54
(1989).
12 Somejournalists have observed that the over-the-counter market may be supe-
rior to the organized exchanges. See, e.g., Susan Lee, Off The Boards: Why OTC is Favored
Over NYSE, BARRONS, Sept. 12, 1983, at 42, cols. 1 & 5. An empirical study suggests that
NASDAQ is a more efficient organization for marketability of stocks than the NYSE.
Hamilton, supra note 5, at 502; see also Macey & Haddock, supra note 1, at 347-50 (argu-
ing that over-the-counter markets provide liquidity equal to or greater than that pro-
vided by organized exchanges).
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any significant market power over listing firms.' 3
In addition to offering liquidity, organized stock exchanges
have come to offer three other services that listing firms view as val-
uable. These other functions (monitoring, devising standard form
contracts, and lending reputational capital to listing firms) all re-
duce the agency costs that are endemic to the modem publicly held
corporation. As we will discuss later, however, various close substi-
tutes have emerged that directly compete with stock exchanges.
A. Sources of Secondary Market Liquidity
Liquidity is a market characteristic that assures investors that
they can promptly purchase or dispose of stock at a price closely
related to the market's best estimate of the present value of the fu-
ture income stream that the stock will generate for investors. 14
Thus, market liquidity is comprised of three elements. The first ele-
ment is simply that investors must be able to buy or sell stock
promptly. Second, liquidity requires that the price at which inves-
tors sell their shares be rationally related to the market's existing
estimation of the firm's earnings prospects. Such an estimation is
considered "unbiased" in the sense that investors are assured that
the same market factors and conditions that dictated the initial
purchase price for their shares will serve to establish the ultimate
sales price. In an illiquid market, the ultimate sales price can be
biased downward by artificial conditions, such as the lack of a willing
buyer. Finally, the information on stock prices must be produced
and disseminated at low cost.
One commentator has defined liquidity as "a market character-
istic that enables investors to dispose of or purchase securities at a
price reasonably related to the preceding price."' 5 But modern fi-
nance theory strongly suggests that this definition of market liquid-
ity is erroneous. In particular, the weak form of the Efficient Capital
Market Hypothesis, which has been subjected to rigorous empirical
scrutiny, has established that current price movements fully reflect
any information contained in previous stock prices.' 6 The Efficient
Capital Market Hypothesis implies that share values already reflect
13 Gary C. Sanger &JohnJ. McConnell, Stock Exchange Listings, Firm Value and Security
Market Efficiency: The Impact of NASDAQ, 21 J. FIN. QUANT. ANALYSIS 1, 22 (1986) (noting
that the introduction of NASDAQ in the over-the-counter market has reduced the li-
quidity advantage provided by the NYSE).
14 See WILLIAM KLEIN &JOHN COFFEE, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 272
(1986) (describing how the price of a share of stock is determined).
15 Poser, supra note 5, at 886.
16 JAMES H. LORIE, PETER DODD & MARY HAMILTON KEMPTON, THE STOCK MARKET:
THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 56 (2d ed. 1985).
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all publicly available information about the underlying companies. 17
Thus stock prices adjust to reflect new information about the earn-
ings prospects of the relevant companies. The definition of liquidity
on the stock exchanges should reflect the insights of share price
movements gleaned from the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis.
Investors value liquidity for two reasons. First, as the costs as-
sociated with buying and selling assets go down, such assets become
more valuable to investors. Because market liquidity implies that
investors can dispose of their shares quickly, it also implies that the
transactions costs related to holding such shares are low. In addi-
tion to reducing transactions costs, liquidity reduces information
costs for market participants. Competition among market profes-
sionals in a liquid market "assures even the more ignorant investors
that these market prices reflect all the publicly available information
about the firms behind the securities." 18 This is because these "ig-
norant market investors" can rely on the market's price setting
mechanism to perform the valuation process that the investor would
otherwise have to perform himself in an illiquid market.
Consequently, owners of closely held firms have a very strong
incentive to ensure that there will be a secondary market of high
quality when they sell their firms' shares to the public because pub-
lic investors will pay less for shares if they have to trade in an illiquid
market after they are issued.19 Thus initial entrepreneurs who sell
stock to the public bear any costs associated with investor concern
about future illiquid markets because such investors will heavily dis-
count the price they pay for such shares. 20
Firms will therefore select the secondary trading market that is
most likely to provide liquidity for their shares. If a particular sec-
ondary trading market, such as an organized stock exchange, will be
more liquid than a rival market, such as the over-the-counter mar-
ket, then entrepreneurs will be willing to pay to have their shares
listed on that exchange so long as the price that exchange charges
for listing is less than the value added from listing.
Firms should be expected to pay an amount equal to the ex-
pected aggregate diminution in share price that would result if the
entrepreneurs decided against listing. In the remainder of this sec-
17 See generally Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market
Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984); Note, The Efficient Capital Market H)pothesis, Economic
Theory and the Regulation of the Securities Industry, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1031 (1977) (authored
by Christopher Paul Saari).
18 Macey & Haddock, supra note 1, at 325.
19 See W. KLEIN &J. COFFEE, supra note 14, at 213 (discussing illiquidity premium);
Poser, supra note 5, at 886 ("For the sale of a new issue of securities to succeed, prospec-
tive purchasers must have a reasonable assurance of liquidity ... .
20 Macey & Haddock, supra note 1, at 325.
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tion, however, we show that market liquidity is largely endogenously
determined. Factors such as the rate at which the firm generates
new firm-specific information and the number of shares a firm has
outstanding will determine whether the market for a firm's shares is
liquid or not.21 Exogenous factors such as the particular secondary
trading market on which a firm's stock is listed will have little, if
anything, to do with whether a firm's shares enjoy liquidity.22 Thus,
it is unrealistic to require that exchanges or exchange members
maintain liquid markets for the firms whose shares they trade, since
the factors that cause such shares to be liquid are almost wholly
outside of the control of such market participants.
The above discussion indicates that the concept of liquidity is
closely linked to the concept of market efficiency. Undeveloped, il-
liquid, thinly traded securities markets tend to be inefficient, while
highly developed, liquid, thickly traded markets tend to be efficient.
1. Rivalrous Competition Among Market Professionals as a Source of
Liquidity
The reason this correlation between efficiency and liquidity ex-
ists is because the same dynamic market forces that cause markets to
become efficient also cause markets to be liquid. Specifically,
purchasing and selling by relatively well-informed traders causes se-
curities prices to adjust because such trading produces and trans-
mits information about future earnings prospects to the market.2 3
These relatively well-informed traders engage in what is best
described as "information arbitrage." They engage in a costly
search for information that is not already impounded in a firm's
share price, and profit by trading on that information. The cost of
the search includes not only the actual cost of acquiring the infor-
mation, but also the costs of developing and retaining the human
21 Cf Homer Kripke, A Searchfor a Meaningful Disclosure Policy, 31 Bus. LAW. 293, 301
(1975) (The variables weighed by accountants in advising potential investors illustrate
the various kinds of information that affect the value of shares and "the present worth of
future net cash flow.").
22 See also Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Effficient Markets, Costly Informa-
tion, And Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 761, 787 (1985):
Models of market efficiency relied upon in the legal literature treat the
available information as exogenous by simply asking how the market will
respond given a certain amount of information; they fail to account for
individual decisions to obtain information. A better approach would re-
gard the information set relative to which the market is efficient as endog-
enous; the efficient market hypothesis should be embedded in a general
model that simultaneously explains both investors' decisions to acquire
information and the process of market aggregation of information held
by investors.
23 Myron S. Scholes, The Market for Securities: Substitution versus Price Pressure and the
Effects of Information on Share Prices, 45J. Bus. 179, 183 (1972).
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capital necessary to assimilate and evaluate the information once
they have obtained it.24 Thus rivalrous competition among well-
informed market professionals causes rapid assimilation of informa-
tion accessible to the community of investment analysts into share
prices at low cost to investors. 25
Large firms continuously generate new information about their
earnings prospects from a wide array of sources. Among the
sources of such new information are a firm's regular quarterly earn-
ings reports, disclosures about acquisition or divestiture plans,
changes in the composition of the board of directors or top manage-
ment, information about the progress of new production techniques
or the progress of the firm's research and development efforts, and
even new information about pending litigation. 26 All of these
sources of information will alter the market's information set about
a firm's expected earnings. As such, all of these sources of informa-
tion reflect possible sources of trading profits for such market pro-
fessionals as analysts, exchange specialists, researchers, portfolio
managers and arbitrageurs.
As long as a firm is continuously generating new information, it
is generating new trading opportunities. These trading opportuni-
ties create liquidity because they ensure that there will be a continu-
ous stream of buyers and sellers for a firm's shares. The crucial
point here is that liquidity, like share value itself, is largely endoge-
nously determined-the nature of the firm itself will determine
whether the secondary market for the firm's stock is liquid or illiq-
uid. The more frequently trading opportunities are generated by a
firm, the more liquid we would expect the firm's shares to be.27
Thus, all else equal, the more volatile the price fluctuations of a
firm's shares, the more liquid we would expect the market for those
shares to be, because this volatility would present an abundance of
trading opportunities for market professionals.
Similarly, the larger the number of shares that a firm has out-
standing, the more liquid we would expect the market to be for
those shares. This is because the profit making opportunities for
market professionals increases as the number of shares outstanding
for a firm goes up. To illustrate the point, imagine two firms, X and
Y. These firms are identical in all respects except that firm X has ten
24 See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 17, at 571-72.
25 Id. at 572.
26 See generally BENJAMIN GRAHAM, GRAHAM AND DODD'S SECURITY ANALYSIS 95-111
(5th ed. 1988) (discussion of information sources used by security analysts); Kripke,
supra note 21.
27 If a market is truly efficient, prices adjust even with minimal trading. The text is
based on the premise that market efficiency is affected by costs of producing and dissem-
inating information. See generally Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 17.
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times as many shares outstanding as firm Y. If a new piece of infor-
mation becomes available that should cause the price of shares in
firm X and firm Y to double, investment professionals will only be
able to acquire a certain percentage of the stock (up to five percent
under current U.S. law) before disclosure obligations are trig-
gered.28 This means that market professionals can purchase ten
times as many shares of stock in firm X before being forced to dis-
close the size of their investment in the firm, which, in effect, will
reveal the information they have uncovered. This observation
would hold even in the absence of the affirmative disclosure obliga-
tions of the securities laws, because the firm with the larger number
of outstanding shares would have a larger average daily trading vol-
ume. Investment professionals would therefore be able to purchase
a greater number of shares in X before the decoding process of un-
informed traders caused the information to become generally
known and triggered a rise in the price of Xs shares to its correct
level.29
2. Additional Incentives for Market Participants to Provide Liquidity:
The Influence of the Market for New Issues
The above subsection showed that rivalrous competition
among investment professionals for firm-specific corporate informa-
tion is an important source of secondary market liquidity. Those
market professionals who are the first to acquire, assimilate and re-
act to new information will be able to obtain trading profits. There
are two by-products to the activities of these market professionals.
The first is that they drive share prices to their efficient levels.3 0
The second is that they provide liquidity to the marketplace by pro-
viding a continuous stream of purchasers and sellers for a firm's
stock.
But it is also clear that certain investment bankers provide li-
quidity for many firms for which there is little trading volume by
most market professionals and little investment interest on the part
of traders generally. This phenomenon can be explained by the in-
fluence of the new issues market. Investment bankers compete
heavily for the fees associated with serving as lead underwriter for
firms involved in the new issue of securities. Such lead underwriters
obtain significant management fees for the services they provide. 31
28 See Jonathan R. Macey & Jeffrey M. Netter, Regulation 13D and the Regulatory Pro-
cess, 65 WASH. U.L.Q. 131 (1987) (describing and analyzing SEC Rule 13D, which con-
tains the disclosure obligations described in the text).
29 Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 17, at 571-79.
30 See Note, supra note 17, at 1056 (competing securities analysis is one of the mech-
anisms that helps achieve market efficiency).
31 MICHAEL HALLORAN, GOING PUBLIC 24 (5th ed. 1983) (underwriter's fees are
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Investment bankers never lose because the securities brought to
market in an initial public offering of securities generally trade at a
significant discount to the prices of securities in the secondary trad-
ing markets.3 2
These discounts, which average over sixteen percent,33 are far
too large to be explained as compensation for the risk experienced
by the underwriters who purchase the issues.3 4 These discounts are
also perplexing in light of the fact that the issuers themselves should
have better information about their firms' cash flows than outside
investors such as' underwriters, and thus should be able to protect
themselves against systematic underpricing.
Perhaps the explanation for this systematic underpricing of new
issues is that issuers are paying the underwriters for more than sim-
ply the immediate provision of underwriting services. Specifically,
issuers are paying for an implicit promise by the underwriters that
they will provide a continuous two-way market for the firm's shares
subsequent to the underwriting. The issuers realize that the exis-
tence of such a two-way market is of value to investors and will
therefore increase the offering price of the shares.3 5 Thus the issu-
ers are willing to pay the underwriters during the initial public offer-
ing for the implicit promise that the underwriters will provide
liquidity in the form of a continuous two-sided market in the future.
Note, however, that this implicit contract calls for payment up
front by the issuer, but for performance by the underwriter long
into the future. The question inevitably arises as to how the issuer
can be assured that the underwriters will perform their end of the
agreement. As it turns out, however, performance is not a problem
because investment bankers will continue to make secondary mar-
kets for new issues they have underwritten in order to attract new
business in the future. Thus underwriters want to develop and
maintain a reputation for providing high quality secondary markets
for the issues they have underwritten in order to attract new busi-
often 7-10% of proceeds from an initial offering); Carl W. Schneider, Joseph M. Manko
& Robert S. Kant, Going Public: Practice, Procedure and Consequences, 27 VILL. L. REv. 1, 29
(1981).
32 Roger C. Ibbotson, Jody L. Sindelar & Jay R. Ritter, Initial Public Offerings, 1 J.
APPLIED CORP. FIN. 37 (1988) (finding an average initial return of 16.37%o for 8668 new
issues between 1969 and 1987).
33 Id.
34 See Mark Grinblatt & Chuan Yang Hwang, Signalling and the Pricing of New Issues,
44 J. FIN. 393, 393 (1989). Empirical studies are yet to be done for the Japanese
markets.
35 Poser, supra note 5, at 886 ("For the sale of a new issue of securities to succeed,
prospective purchasers must have a reasonable assurance of liquidity in the market for
the security. Thus, the success of new-issue markets is dependent on the effectiveness of
trading markets.").
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ness in the future. This incentive to attract new underwriting reve-
nues provides investment bankers with the incentive to perform
their implicit contractual obligations to maintain robust secondary
markets in the issues they have underwritten.
3. Stock Exchanges as Providers of Liquidity
Neither of the two sources of liquidity identified thus far de-
pends on the existence of an organized stock exchange. Rather,
both sources of market liquidity stem from the private incentives of
investment banks to provide liquidity. In the first instance, financial
intermediaries provide liquidity in order to earn positives rates of
return from the information they generate as market professionals.
In the second instance, such intermediaries provide secondary mar-
ket liquidity as part of an implicit contract to provide secondary
market liquidity for the new issues they underwrite. Stock ex-
changes do, however, enhance the secondary market liquidity of the
issues they accept for listing.
Exchanges enhance secondary market liquidity because they
serve as central producers and disseminators of information. Ex-
changes are central information processors because their rules gen-
erally prohibit trading in exchange-listed stocks off an exchange.
Thus virtually all trades are consummated on the floor of the ex-
change on which a firm's shares are listed.3 6 Exchanges are efficient
disseminators of information because their central physical location
allows exchange officials to compile information about price levels
and trading volumes as trading occurs. Thus organized exchanges
are able to offer member firms up to the minute trading information
on listed stocks, regardless of where those member firms are lo-
cated. Officials of the NYSE have described these features as the
most important product offered by that Exchange.3 7
As secondary trading markets become more efficient, it be-
comes more difficult for market professionals to earn positive rates
of return because new information becomes impounded in securi-
ties prices so quickly that fewer people can benefit from possessing
such information.38 Thus, as secondary markets become more effi-
cient, traders must have instantaneous information about price
movements and about the activities of rival traders. Organized
stock exchanges, by providing a centralized location for secondary
36 Exchanges' rules that prohibit member firms from trading listed securities off the
exchange are called off-board trading restrictions. See Macey & Haddock, supra note 1, at
332-37 (discussing off-board trading rules on the NYSE).
37 Interview with various NYSE officials in New York City (March 8, 1989).
38 See Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 22, at 795 ("As more investors purchase
research, the price grows more informative and the value of doing research declines.").
See generally Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 17.
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market trading, are well suited to providing information about re-
cent trades.
Organized exchanges can disseminate complete information
about trading patterns virtually instantaneously by electronic
means. The rapid dissemination of information for exchange-listed
securities lowers the search costs of market professionals who need
price information quickly in order to make trading decisions. The
more efficient the market for a particular stock, the more quickly this
information is needed.
Furthermore, exchanges may enhance secondary market trad-
ing liquidity because they lower search costs for purchasers and sell-
ers of securities. If a security is listed on an exchange, would-be
traders will know immediately where to go to make trades. By con-
trast, if a security is not listed on an exchange, traders must search
for a party willing to appear on the other side of the transaction. As
Professor Fischel has pointed out, in this regard "[t]here is little
fundamental difference between the economic role of a stock ex-
change and that of any ordinary shopping center or flea market. All
facilitate trading by bringing together buyers and sellers in a known
location and thereby reducing search costs." '3 9
The importance of economizing on search costs should not be
trivialized. Having a centralized trading location is very important
to market participants who wish to obtain the best price for their
stock. In the absence of an exchange, a trader who wanted to buy or
sell stock would have to communicate separately with several market
makers to be assured of obtaining the best price.40 Under rapidly
changing market conditions, it is difficult to obtain the best price for
one's shares as prices may change before the trader with the best
price can be located.
Thus it seems probable that the existence of organized stock
exchanges does enhance the liquidity of the firms whose shares are
listed on such exchanges.4 1 However, it is not the rules of ex-
changes that provide this additional liquidity. Rather, the simple fact
that exchanges provide a single centralized forum where securities
trading can occur, enhances secondary market liquidity for three
reasons. First, exchanges facilitate the market's ability to produce
39 Daniel R. Fischel, Organized Exchanges and the Regulation of Dual Class Common Stock,
54 U. CHI. L. REv. 119, 121 n.9 (1987).
40 SENA M. TINIC & RICHARD WEST, INVESTING IN SECURITIES: AN EFFICIENT MAR-
KETs APPROACH 51 (1979).
41 The economic function of trading markets is to create liquidity-this allows in-
vestors to purchase securities at a price reasonably related to the preceding price. S.
ROBBINS, supra note 9, at 33. Empirical studies for NYSE listings that support this point
include Theoharry Grammatikos & George Papaioannou, Market Reaction to NYSE List-
ings: Tests of the Marketability Gains Hypothesis, 9J. FIN. REs. 215 (1986).
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trading information by forcing all trading to a central location. Sec-
ond, exchanges lower the costs of disseminating information about
recent trades to market participants, thereby lowering the costs of
following exchange-listed stocks. Finally, the fixed location of stock
exchanges lowers the transactions costs of those wishing to consum-
mate trades, since they provide a known location for would-be buy-
ers and sellers to meet.
Note, however, that the benefits provided by exchanges are all
by-products of the fact that the exchanges provide a centralized lo-
cation for trades to take place. When exchanges were invented,
there was no substitute for an exchange floor as a forum for securi-
ties trading. As technology has advanced, however, computer link-
ages can perform the same function as a fixed geographic location.
Indeed, NASDAQ, the second most active exchange in the world,42
is not really an exchange at all, but rather a close substitute-an
exchange-like system that links participants via computer to provide
continuous bid-and-asked quotations for companies meeting the
system's listing criteria. 43 This computer linked system provides vir-
tually the same benefits as an organized exchange. Traders obtain
instantaneous, continuous bid-and-asked quotations for the stocks
listed on the system,44 thus making it possible for central informa-
tion processing to occur. In addition, the search costs historically
associated with trading over-the-counter stock have been elimi-
nated, since computer screens supply the identification of those
market participants willing to consummate trades.45
B. Monitoring of Exchange-Listed Companies
As discussed above, the very fact that exchanges provide a cen-
tralized trading forum aids secondary market liquidity. Similarly, an
exchange's centralized location also serves as a benefit to passive
investors who wish to obtain low-cost monitoring of the markets in
which their shares trade.46
It is widely known that, in a variety of contexts, corporate insid-
ers have a fiduciary duty to refrain from engaging in trading on the
basis of the material, non-public information in their possession. 47
42 See NASDAQAND THE OTC MARKET, supra note 11, at 23.
43 NASDAQ, 1988 FACT BOOK 10 [hereinafter 1988 FACT BOOK]; S. TINIC & R.
WEST, supra note 40, at 51.
44 LEO LOLL, JR. & JULIAN G. BUCKLEY, THE OVER-THE-COUNTER SECURITIES MAR-
KETS 179-80 (4th ed. 1981); NASDAQAND THE OTC MARKET, supra note 11, at 12 (NAS-
DAQ displays continuously updated price quotations.).
45 L. LOLL &J. BUCKLEY, supra note 44.
46 Jonathan R. Macey, From Fairness to Contract: The New Direction of the Rules Against




Clearly, however, trading on such information is exceedingly hard
to detect.48 Confining all trading to a centralized location at which
trading patterns can be scrutinized greatly facilitates the ability of
the markets to monitor breaches of fiduciary duties by officers and
directors. Where monitoring and detecting insider trading is easier,
the costs of such activity will be higher, and the incidence of the
activity will be lower.49 Thus, organized stock exchanges can reduce
agency costs associated with the separation of ownership and con-
trol within large, publicly held firms by lowering the costs of moni-
toring certain breaches of fiduciary duty by corporate insiders.50
Investors need protection not only from insider trading, but
also from share price manipulation by market professionals as well.
Investors often give orders to buy or sell stock at the current market
price. Such orders provide ample opportunities for abuse in volatile
trading markets because market professionals can trade stock at a
price wholly unrelated to the actual share value. For example, sup-
pose the most recent quoted market for a firm's shares is $25.00 bid,
and $25.25 offered. Suppose, however, that the market is extremely
volatile, and market professionals recognize that the best current
bid for the firm's shares would be around $15.00. It would be possi-
ble for a market professional who received a market buy order to
execute that order at $25.25, the last available quoted offering price.
While such a trade would be a violation of the market professional's
fiduciary obligation to his customer, such violations are extremely
difficult to monitor. Focusing all trading on the floor of an ex-
change benefits investors by making such over-reaching easier to
detect.
To the extent that the enhanced monitoring available on organ-
ized exchanges lowers monitoring costs, firms will be willing to pay
to have their shares listed on such exchanges. 51 This is because the
expected costs to investors associated with such events as insider
trading and stock price manipulation will be borne by the entrepre-
neurs selling the firm's stock to the public. Investors will discount
the price they are willing to pay for a company's stock by an amount
48 Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading as an Agency Cost Problem, in PRINCIPALS AND
AGENTS: THE STRuaruRE OF BUSINESS 81 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds.
1985).
49 George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526, 527
(1970).
50 See Michael C.Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behav-
ior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3J. FIN. EcoN. 305 (1976) (describing the nature
of agency costs within the publicly held firm).
51 Macey, supra note 46, at 59; Easterbrook, supra note 48, at 94 (although the costs
of writing a prohibition against insider trading into a firm's corporate charter may be
low, the costs of enforcing the provision could be quite high due to the high costs of
monitoring and detecting insider trading activity).
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equal to their expected losses from insider trading and stock price
manipulation.5 2 Investors are unlikely to believe empty assurances
by firms that they will refrain from engaging in manipulative stock
trading because they realize that they cannot monitor fraudulent
trading activities. Listing on an exchange enables investors to take
advantage of monitoring by a third party-the exchange itself. Con-
sequently, firms have an incentive to list on exchanges to increase
the price they can obtain for their shares in initial public offerings.
Furthermore, it seems clear that there are significant economies
of scale associated with centralized monitoring of stock trading.53
For one thing, stock price monitoring requires specialized skills.
With the aid of computers, however, a single stock monitor can use
those specialized skills to monitor hundreds of stocks. Similarly, the
same technology necessary to monitor a single stock can be used to
monitor other stocks. Thus, rather than having hundreds of
individual firms acquire the technology and the expertise necessary
to monitor stock trading, it is more efficient to have an organized
stock exchange provide a single, specialized monitoring, in the form
of so-called "stock watch" programs, for hundreds of firms
simultaneously.
C. Providing Off-the-Rack Rules
Contracting is costly. If organized stock exchanges can reduce
the costs of the contracting process within the publicly held corpo-
ration, there will be a demand for the services of exchange. One of
the costs associated with the contracting process, of course, is the
cost of monitoring those contracts once they are formed. To the
extent that such contracts explicitly or implicitly involve prohibi-
tions on the trading of securities by corporate insiders, the above
section showed that exchanges can reduce the costs of the intra-firm
contracting process.
Another cost associated with contracting within the firm is the
cost of forming contracts and the cost of enforcing those con-
tracts. 54 Exchanges provide benefits to listed firms by supplying
standard contract terms and enforcement services that reduce the
costs associated with intra-firm contracting.
Thus we observe organized exchanges offering listed firms off-
the-rack rules on matters seemingly unrelated to secondary market
trading. For example, the NYSE requires listed companies to have a
minimum of two outside directors,5 5 and to have an audit committee
52 See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 50, at 305.
53 Macey, supra note 46, at 59.
54 See id.; Easterbrook, supra note 48, at 94.
55 An outside director is a director who is not an employee, officer, or former of-
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comprised solely of independent directors. 56 These provisions en-
sure investors that the internal corporate activities of listed compa-
nies, as well as transactions on the floor of stock exchanges will
receive regular supervision from independent, outside sources.
Similarly, NYSE rules require that listed firms review and oversee
transactions with related parties on an ongoing basis.57 Such trans-
actions inevitably involve a conflict of interest between manage-
ment's duty of loyalty to shareholders and management's interest in
the welfare of the related party, so it is to be expected that share-
holders particularly would value scrutiny of such transactions.
D. Stock Exchanges as Reputational Intermediaries
The NYSE was founded in 1792,58 the TSE in 1878.59 Over
time, stock exchanges have developed significant reputational capi-
tal that is of value to listing firms. It is very costly for potential in-
vestors to obtain information about all of the companies that
present attractive investment opportunities. Listing on an exchange
can provide a valuable filter to investors, informing them that the
securities listed are of high quality.60
This signalling service is valuable to issuers as well as investors.
Issuers find it costly to make credible assurances to potential inves-
tors that their securities are of high quality. An exchange listing
provides an independent verification of quality. This verification is
credible because the loss to the exchange's reputational capital re-
sulting from a false declaration of quality inevitably will exceed any
short term gains the exchange might obtain by making such a false
declaration. Thus listing on an exchange reduces the costs to inves-
tors of searching for high quality investment opportunities and low-
ers the costs to issuers of signalling to investors that their securities
are high quality. As the NYSE points out in its advertising literature
to potential listing companies, "the prestige and worldwide recogni-
tion associated with [being] a 'New York Stock Exchange' [listed]
company is a distinct advantage not only with investors, but also
ficer of the listing firm or one of its subsidiaries or divisions, or a relative of a principal
executive of the firm, or an individual or member of an organization acting as an advi-
sor, consultant, legal counsel, receiving compensation on a continuing basis from the
company other than director's fees. NYSE LISTING STANDARDS, supra note 7, at 6.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 7.
58 See LEONARD SLOANE, THE ANATOMY OF THE FLOOR 15 (1980).
59 See A PROFILE OF THE TOKYO STOCK EXCHANGE: HISTORY, STRUCTURE AND A VARI-
Er OF SERVICES 2 (undated monograph) [hereinafter TSE PROFILE].
60 Thus far the results of the empirical studies on this issue have been inconclusive.
See Theoharry Grammatikos & GeorgeJ. Papaioannou, The Informational Value of Listing on
the New York Stock Exchange, 21 FIN. REv. 485, 497-98 (1986); Sanger & McConnell, supra
note 13, at 22-23.
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with lenders, suppliers, customers and prospective employees."' 61
Consistent with this analysis, exchanges require that listed firms
meet certain listing standards. 62 These standards require that listed
firms maintain a net income in excess of a specified amount, and
that the aggregate market value of outstanding shares exceeds a
minimum amount. In addition, listing standards require that firms
have a certain minimum number of shareholders and maintain a cer-
tain monthly trading volume. These latter requirements ensure that
exchange-listed securities will retain a certain minimum level of li-
quidity for the protection of investors.
This section has unbundled the service offered by organized
stock exchanges into four component parts. With this background
in mind, the following sections describe the operation of the New
York and the Tokyo Stock Exchanges. We observe that, while these
exchanges provide all of these services, close substitutes have
emerged that serve as serious rivals. This is particularly true in the
case of the NYSE.
II
THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE
The New York Stock Exchange claims to be the "world's pre-
mier securities marketplace." 63 Support for this claim may come
from the fact that in 1987 the NYSE had the largest dollar volume of
equity trading of any exchange in the world. 64 Irrespective of its
position in world markets, the NYSE clearly enjoys a dominant posi-
tion among U.S. securities exchanges. "The value of trading on the
NYSE represents 77% of total value of U.S. equity trading activity,"
and is three times greater than the trading value of any other U.S.
exchange.65
These market share figures, however, overstate the degree of
market power enjoyed by the NYSE for three reasons. First, most of
the firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange are dually listed on
other exchanges. 66 While exchange rules traditionally bar exchange
members from trading listed firms' shares off an exchange, firms
may list their shares on more than one exchange, and brokerage
firms that are not members of the NYSE are free to trade shares of
61 NYSE LISTING STANDARDS, supra note 7, at 3.
62 Id at 4-5; Tokyo Stock Exchange Listing Standards.
63 NEw YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, 1988 ANNUAL REPORT, at 57 [hereinafter NYSE AN-
NUAL REPORT].
64 1988 Fact Book, supra note 43, at 11. In 1988, the TSE had the largest dollar
volume of equity trading in the world.
65 NYSE LISTING STANDARDS, supra note 7, at 1.
66 [1979-1980] SEC ANNUAL REPORT at 130.
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NYSE listed companies off of the Exchange. 67 Thus if the NYSE
alters its pricing policies in ways that harm listed firms,
nonexchange members who trade the stock of such firms can simply
redirect their trading volume to rival exchanges on which the shares
are dually listed.
Second, even so-called off-board trading restrictions, which
prohibit exchange members from trading shares in listed securities
in the over-the-counter market, are eroding.68 SEC Rule 19c-3 pro-
hibits exchanges from restricting secondary market trading for
shares listed on an exchange after April 26, 1979.69 For these
stocks, the NYSE faces potential competition from the over-the-
counter markets for trading volume because members can begin
making markets for over-the-counter shares in these firms. This
competition serves as a real constraint on the ability of the NYSE to
exercise market power over certain listed firms.
Finally, equity trading that occurs on the floor of the NYSE can
easily shift overseas. For example, on October 19, 1987, the day of
the most recent market crash, one billion dollars of American stocks
were traded in London before the New York markets opened.70
This "shows that American securities markets are vulnerable to for-
eign competition on a meaningful scale."'71
The remainder of this section examines the services offered by
the NYSE. As suggested above, it appears that the emergence of
close substitutes for the services offered by the NYSE effectively
constrains that exchange from exercising market power.
A. Liquidity on the NYSE-The Specialist System
In Section I we argued that the major sources of market liquid-
ity were endogenously determined. In modem trading markets,
stock exchanges can do little to enhance the inherent liquidity char-
acteristics of a listing firm. The principal exception to this observa-
tion concerns share price reporting. As noted above, exchanges
provide an exceedingly efficient forum for reporting information
about trades. 72 Information about price and volume for trades con-
67 See Poser, supra note 5, at 888; see also Craig Torres & William Power, Big Board is
Losing Some of Its Influence Over Stock Trading, Wall St. J., Tuesday, April 17, 1990 at Al
(describing increasing trend to make trades in NYSE listed stocks off of the Exchange).
68 Id. at 931-41 (examining the historical developments and the eventual decline of
off-board trading restrictions).
69 Securities Exchange Act Release No. 16,889, 45 Fed. Reg. 41, 157 (1980). In
addition, Rule 19c-3 prohibits exchanges from placing trading restrictions on stocks that
listed on an exchange prior to April 26, 1979, but which later were delisted. Id.
70 Lawrence Harris, The Dangers of Regulatory Overreaction to the October 1987 Crash, 74
CORNELL L. REv. 927 (1989).
71 Id. at 936.
72 See supra text accompanying notes 36-40.
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summated on the NYSE trading floor is generally recorded on the
NYSE's Consolidated Tape less than ten seconds after such trades
occur.73 This information is of great value to investors, and pro-
vides market professionals with an incentive to follow NYSE listed
stocks since such information dramatically reduces search costs.
Similarly, a central physical location enhances liquidity by reducing
the time involved in finding the best price for a security.74
At first blush, the existence of the specialist system on the
NYSE seems to contradict the observation that the presence or ab-
sence of an organized exchange is irrelevant to secondary market
liquidity. The specialist system is unique to American trading mar-
kets. When a firm is listed on an exchange such as the NYSE, which
operates a specialist system, responsibility for maintaining market
liquidity for the firm's shares is allocated to an exchange specialist
firm. Each specialist firm occupies a particular post on the floor of
the exchange. All trading in the listed security on the exchange
must take place at the specialist firm's post, regardless of whether
the transaction is for the trader's own account, or for the account of
a customer.
75
The notion that specialists provide market liquidity is embraced
by both the SEC and the NYSE and is implicit in SEC and NYSE
rules governing exchange specialists. To this end, both organiza-
tions require specialists to maintain fair and orderly markets. 76 It
has even been said that "the focal point of the exchange market is
the specialist. His statutory obligation to maintain a fair and orderly
market is the justification for his existence and the reason for his
importance." 77 Unfortunately, however, no one has ever come up
with a good definition of what it means to maintain a fair and or-
derly market, and there are no objective criteria against which to
judge the conduct of exchange specialist. 78 The most precise expo-
sition of the rules governing the behavior of exchange specialists is
contained in the NYSE rules. The rules state:
The maintenance of a fair and orderly market implies the mainte-
nance of price continuity with reasonable depth, and the minimiz-
ing of the effects of temporary disparity between supply and
demand....
73 NYSE ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 63, at 19.
74 See supra text accompanying note 40.
75 See Poser, supra note 5, at 889.
76 SEC Rule 1I b-l(a)(2)(iii), promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78k(b) (1988); 17 C.F.R. § 240.Ilb-I (1988); 2 New York Stock Ex-
change Guide (CCH) para. 2104.10 (1989) [hereinafter NYSE GUIDE].
77 Nicholas Wolfson, Kenneth I. Rosenblum & Thomas A. Russo, The Securities Mar-
kets: An Overuiew, 16 How. LJ. 791, 815 (1971) (citations omitted).
78 See id. at 815-19.
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In connection with the maintenance of a fair and orderly mar-
ket, it is commonly desirable that a member acting as a specialist
engage to a reasonable degree under existing circumstances in
dealings for his own account when lack of price continuity, lack of
depth, or disparity between supply and demand exists [sic] or is
reasonably to be anticipated.79
Even this elaborate formulation is quite vague. There is no in-
dication as to how much fluctuation in "depth and continuity" is
permitted within an "orderly" market, and there is no suggestion as
to what determines whether a specialist has acted reasonably under
"existing circumstances." 80
The regulatory regime under which exchange specialists oper-
ate is peculiar in light of the discussion in Part I about the sources of
market liquidity. After all, if market liquidity is endogenously deter-
mined, then it makes little sense to hold exchange specialists legally
responsible for a phenomenon over which they have no control.
Empirical studies suggest that specialists do not have the same econ-
omies of scale as do dealers in individual stocks.8'
The unrealistic nature of the rules governing specialists is even
more evident in light of modern finance theory, which suggests that
small investors increasingly will employ institutional investors such
as mutual funds to make trading decisions on their behalf. More-
over, when modem trading practices such as portfolio insurance
and other dynamic hedging strategies are taken into account, the
notion of obligating an exchange specialist to maintain a fair and
orderly market becomes simply ludicrous. The Capital Asset Pric-
ing Model posits that there is a direct trade-off between risk and
return in a competitive trading market.8 2 Investors must be com-
pensated for accepting additional increments of risk with the pros-
pect of obtaining higher rates of return on their investment. The
existing theory and available evidence also indicates that investors
can eliminate some of the risks associated with holding a diversified
portfolio of securities, while other risks cannot be diversified away.83
Competitive trading markets will only compensate investors for
79 NYSE GUIDE, supra note 76, para. 2104.10, at 2705.
80 Wolfson, Rosenblum & Russo, supra note 77, at 816-19 ("continuity" and
"depth" are defined generally-however, it is clear that "it is impossible to define with
mathematical certainty the boundaries of the specialist's obligation").
81 See, e.g., George j. Benston & Robert L. Hagerman, Determinants of Bid-Asked
Spreads in the Over-the-Counter Market, 1J. FIN. ECON. 353 (1974);James L. Hamilton, Com-
petition, Scale Economies, and Transaction Cost in the Stock Market, I 1 J. FIN. QUANTrrATIVE
ANALYSIS 779 (1976).
82 For discussion of the Capital Asset Pricing Model, see, e.g., THOMAS E. COPELAND
&J. FRED WESTON, FINANCIAL THEORY AND CORPORATE PoLIcY 185-200 (2d ed. 1983).
83 See, e.g., Franco Modigliani & Gerald A. Pogue, An Introduction to Risk and Return,
FIN. ANALYsTs J., March/April, 1974, at 68.
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those risks that they cannot avoid through diversification. Conse-
quently, all investors have a strong incentive to diversify their in-
vestment portfolios. One low-cost method of diversification is to
buy a mutual fund. But almost any pooled investment vehicle, in-
cluding life insurance and employer pension funds, can provide the
benefits of diversification. Thus, it is not surprising that institutional
investors have become an increasingly important part of the activi-
ties of stock exchanges.
Unlike individual investors, these institutional investors are
likely to buy and sell stock in large blocks. While specialist firms
might be capable of providing liquidity to markets dominated by in-
dividual small investors, as markets have become dominated by in-
stitutions, specialist firms have even been unable to handle what
have become routine transactions.8 4 Thus, when a large block of
stock is to be sold by an institutional investor, there is no expecta-
tion that the exchange specialist will handle the transaction. Rather,
the brokerage firm engaged to consummate the sale will not contact
the specialist on behalf of the institutional investor but "will call
other dealers and institutions to find one interested in the other end
of the deal. The specialist on the floor of the NYSE, the subject of
much attention, actually serves as a market maker only for the
residual small blocks and odd lots of stock.' '8 5 Thus, most trading
on the NYSE closely resembles that done in the over-the-counter
markets without the benefit of a specialist.8 6
While block trading by institutional investors made the task of
the specialists difficult, portfolio insurance has made it impossible.
Portfolio insurance is simply a trading strategy designed to prevent
the value of an investor's portfolio from falling below a certain pre-
designated floor (known as the strike price), while still permitting
the investor some degree of participation in the upside associated
with a volatile equity position.8 7 Portfolio insurance attempts to
replicate the returns to a stock put option by a dynamic trading
strategy.88 In a nutshell, portfolio insurance causes investors to buy
stock when the market is rising in order to lock in gains, and to sell
stock when the market is falling, and when the value of the portfolio
reaches the predesignated floor.
Portfolio insurance employs computer executed algebraic for-
84 See Nicholas Wolfson & Thomas A. Russo, The Stock Exchange Specialist: An Eco-
nomic And Legal Analysis, 1970 DuKE L.J. 707, 740-41 (institutional traders on the NYSE
have created an "unprecedented strain" on specialists).
85 Fischel, supra note 39, at 126.
86 Id.
87 For a complete explanation of portfolio insurance, see Mark Rubinstein, Deriva-
tive Assets Analysis, 1 ECON. PERSP. 73 (1987).
88 Harris, supra note 70.
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mulas that dictate when shares will be traded in an attempt to repli-
cate the returns to a stock option. It is generally thought that one of
the causes of the stock market crash of 1987 was portfolio insur-
ance.89 It is easy to see how this is so. When the market began its
decline on "Black Monday," hundreds, perhaps thousands, of com-
puterized portfolio insurance programs were triggered and auto-
matically executed orders to sell their stock. Exchange specialists,
in theory, would have been expected to meet these sell orders so
that an orderly market could be maintained. At the end of the sec-
ond quarter of 1987, just before the crash, between sixty and eighty
billion dollars in assets were being managed by portfolio insur-
ance.90 While this figure represented only about two percent of the
U.S. equity market, over twenty percent of the trades in Standard
and Poor's index futures and NYSE stocks on the day of the crash
were portfolio insurance trades.9'
It also appears clear from the huge selling volume during the
crash that even investors who did not employ portfolio insurance as
part of their trading strategies were influenced by the sales decisions
of the traders with portfolio insurance. 92 These other investors
wanted to liquidate their stock holding before all of the investors
with portfolio insurance attempted to sell. Thus, as other institu-
tional investors saw the rate at which those with portfolio insurance
were selling, the downward pressure on the market increased. 93 Ra-
89 AVNER ARBEL & ALBERT E. KArl, CRASH: TEN DAYS IN OCTOBER . .. WILL IT
STRIKE AGAIN? 117-18 (1989):
The fact that, during the crash, the market was filled with sellers, while
buyers were scarce shut down much of the portfolio insurance. Portfolio
insurance, also requires that indexes of future stock prices be synchro-
nized closely with the actual trading price of the underlying stocks; but,
[i]f wide gaps develop between future and current cash prices, [like that
during the crash,] then the insurance systems falter.... Many market
professionals believe that portfolio insurance, while not responsible for
starting the crash, may have accelerated the stock market decline.
See also SECURrIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION DIVISION OF MARKET REGULATION, THE
OCTOBER 1987 MARKET BREAK 3-13 to 3-17 (Feb. 1988) [hereinafter SEC REPORT]
(Chapter 3 discusses the role of portfolio insurance during the 1987 crash. "[he...
increase in index arbitrage and portfolio insurance trading in the stock market has in-
creased the risks incurred by stock specialists and has strained their ability to provide
liquidity to the stock market." Id. at 3-47.).
90 Hayne Leland & Mark Rubenstein, Comment on the Market Crash: Six Months After, 2
J. ECON. PERSP. 45, 48 (1988).
91 Id.
92 James F. Gammill, Jr. & Terry A. Marsh, Trading Activity and Price Behavior in the
Stock and Stock Index Futures Markets in October 1987, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 25 (1988); SEC
REPORT, supra note 89, at 3-12 ("In addition to direct effects, the use of derivative prod-
ucts in program trading strategies had a significant indirect impact on the markets-
particularly on October 19-in the form of negative market psychology." This reaction
was due in large part to the portfolio insurance "overhang.").
93 BRADY REPORT, supra note 2, at 29.
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tional expectations of investors also played a role:
The activities of a small number of aggressive trading-ori-
ented institutions... posed the prospect of further selling pres-
sure on Monday. These traders could well understand the
strategies of the portfolio insurers and mutual funds .... They
could.., see those institutions falling behind in their selling pro-
grams. The situation presented an opportunity for these traders
to sell in anticipation of the forced selling by portfolio insurers
and mutual funds, with the prospect of repurchasing at lower
prices. 94
These simultaneous sell orders swamped the exchange special-
ists, thwarting their ability to maintain fair and orderly markets since
none of them had sufficient capital to maintain price continuity.95
As the Presidential Task Force established to study the market crash
observed:
The limited nature of some specialists' contributions to price
stability may have been due to the exhaustion of their purchasing
power following attempts to stabilize markets at the open on Oc-
tober 19.
However, for other specialists, lack of purchasing power ap-
pears not to have been the determining factor in their behavior. It
is understandable that specialists would not sacrifice large
amounts of capital in what must have seemed a hopeless attempt
to stem overwhelming waves of selling pressure. Nevertheless,
from the final hours of trading on October 19 through October
20, a substantial number of NYSE specialists appear not to have
been a significant force in counterbalancing market trends.96
But even if the specialists had sufficient capital to meet any li-
quidity demands of the market place, it is not clear that they had an
incentive to do so. If the specialist knows that the market is declin-
ing, it is not rational to expect the specialist to bankrupt itself in a
quixotic attempt to stabilize the market.97 In this regard, specialists
face an acute collective action problem vis-a-vis one another. Be-
cause it is possible to sell shares that one does not own in anticipa-
tion of a declining market, any specialist who attempted to stabilize
94 Id.
95 Harris, supra note 70, at 933. But see Leland & Rubenstein, supra note 90, at 47;
SEC REPORT, supra note 89.
96 BRADY REPORT, supra note 2, at 50; see also SEC REPORT, supra note 89, at 4-26 to
4-27 ("While most specialists performed well under circumstances on the morning of
October 19, there were several instances of questionable specialist activity": first, a
number of stocks were opened at prices well below their Friday, Oct. 16 close; second,
when prices declined sharply some specialists sold more securities than they bought
rather than buying to prop up orderly prices.).
97 SEC REPORT, supra note 89, at 4-27 (Under the circumstances, the specialists
"cannot, and should not, be [expected to be the buyer of last resort.]").
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the market in the face of a rapidly declining market simply would
attract an even greater flurry of sales efforts from short sellers.
Thus it is not surprising that a sample of fifty large capitalization
stocks showed that eighty-two percent of specialists were net sellers
during the declining market of October, 1987.98
Similarly, it also is not surprising that after the crash, specialists
observed that even if they had had additional capital, their actions
during the crisis would not have been significantly different. 99 After
all, as the General Accounting Office observed, when the entire
market wants to sell, it simply is "suicidal to continue to buy." 100
Similarly, an official of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion observed after the crash, "it is not reasonable to expect special-
ists to engage in 'kamikaze' trading strategies."10 1 For the purposes
of this discussion, it is useful to analogize specialists to commercial
bankers. Just as commercial bankers provide liquidity for deposi-
tors, exchange specialists, at least ostensibly, provide liquidity for
investors in the securities for which they are responsible. Despite
the fact that commercial bankers have far greater capital resources
than specialist firms, if exogenous technological factors coalesced to
create a situation in which all depositors would want access to their
funds simultaneously, no bank would have sufficient liquidity to
meet depositors' needs. This is precisely what has developed in the
secondary securities markets. The rise of institutional investors and
the emergence of dynamic hedging strategies such as portfolio in-
surance have rendered specialists obsolete as liquidity providers.
Merely raising the amount of capital that specialists are required to
maintain will not change the situation, since it does nothing to ame-
liorate either the incentive problem or the collective action problem
described above.' 0 2
Most importantly, even if regulations could be imposed that
forced specialists to provide liquidity under current market condi-
tions, it is far from clear that this would be desirable, because it
98 BRADY REPORT, supra note 2, at 49.
99 UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON
THE OCTOBER 1987 CRASH 57 (January 1988) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]; SEC REPORT,
supra note 89, at xviii (The SEC found that additional specialist capital would probably
not have retarded the market decline during the October crash. The report notes a
concern that "present minimum capital requirements ... do not reflect the actual capital
needed ensure the maintenance of fair and orderly markets .....
100 GAO REPORT, supra note 99, at 57.
101 Id.
102 In the wake of the crash, the minimum capital requirement for specialists was
increased from $100,000 to $1,000,000. In addition, specialists now must have an
amount of capital equal to 25 percent of 150 trading units in the common stock in which
they specialize. Finally, specialists are required to be able to assume a position of 150
trading units in the stock for which they specialize, even if that amount is greater than
$1,000,000. NYSE GUIDE, supra note 76, para. 2104.20(l)-(4).
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would be necessary to compensate the specialists for providing this
service. Specialists, like other market makers, provide liquidity to
the trading markets by making a bid-asked spread for the securities
they choose to trade.'0 3 As discussed above, the incentive to pro-
vide a bid-asked spread stems from the desire of market profession-
als to earn trading profits, as well as from the desire to attract new
business from firms going public. 10 4 Thus, while some investment
bankers may make markets in securities with little expectation of
profits in order to attract underwriting revenues, others must be
compensated for providing continuous two-way markets, since pro-
viding such markets exposes traders to risk, and to the carrying
costs of maintaining an inventory of securities. The spread between
the bid side of a market maker's market and the offered side of the
market maker's market reflects these transactions costs. The greater
the expected losses to market makers, the wider this bid-asked
spread will be. 10 5 Since wider bid-asked spreads represent in-
creased transactions costs and lower liquidity for investors, it is clear
that imposing regulations that force specialists to maintain market
liquidity is a self-defeating process. 10 8
The purpose of this section has been to reinforce the point
made in Section I that liquidity is endogenously determined. We
have seen that, even on the NYSE, where specialists are supposed to
maintain market liquidity, the rise of block trading has caused trad-
ing by investment bankers, serving in their capacity as "upstairs
market makers," to assume the role traditionally performed by spe-
cialists on the exchange. These investment bankers, and not the ex-
change specialists, are the real providers of liquidity for the block
trading that has become the dominant form of trading in modem
securities markets. 10 7
Even though the specialists do not appear to be improving the
liquidity characteristics of exchange listed stocks, it would at first
appear that they are not reducing market liquidity. However, for at
least five reasons, specialists may actually impose costs on market
participants that impede liquidity. First, unlike transactions in
stocks that trade over-the-counter, on NASDAQ, or on the TSE, ex-
103 See Wolfson & Russo, supra note 84, at 741.
104 See supra text accompanying notes 23-35.
105 See David D. Haddock &Jonathan R. Macey, Regulation on Demand: A Private Inter-
est Model with an Application to Insider Trading Regulation, 30 J. LAw & EcoN. 311, 331-32
(1987) (discussing market makers' increases in bid-asked spread to compensate for ex-
pected losses from insider trading).
106 See Wolfson & Russo, supra note 84, at 743 (specialist may encounter a conflict of
interest when pressured to sell a large block regardless of the obligation to sell only in a
rising market).
107 Cf Jed Horwitz, When It Rains It Pours: Big Board May Face Strike, AM. BANKER,
Oct. 26, 1987, at 2, 17 (specialist system is "vestige of the horse-and-buggy era").
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change specialists rather than individual market participants are re-
sponsible for establishing the opening price at which shares begin to
trade on any given trading day.' 08 Individual specialists must,
therefore, guess where the market is at the opening. In volatile mar-
kets, it is easy to make misjudgments, and such misjudgments can
aggravate "an already uncertain [market] atmosphere ... ."109
Second, the fact that specialists hold themselves out to the pub-
lic as providers of liquidity to traders creates unrealistic expecta-
tions. Investment managers selling portfolio insurance are
promising their clients that they will be able to liquidate large por-
tions of their stock portfolios very quickly in the case of a market
downturn. The promises of these investment managers are in turn
predicated on the assumption that exchange specialists will provide
the liquidity to effect such massive liquidations. Thus, it should be
recognized that the unrealistic expectations about the ability of spe-
cialists to provide liquidity exacerbated the crash of 1987.110
The third problem posed by the regulatory responsibility given
to exchange specialists concerns trading halts. In addition to auto-
mated "circuit breakers" that force trading to halt automatically if
the market index falls by a certain amount,"' exchange specialists
can order the exchange to halt trading when unusual market condi-
tions exist.1 12 These trading halts reduce market liquidity by post-
poning price changes that will occur anyway when markets
reopen.11 As such, trading halts simply impose the costs of delay
on investors who wish to trade, and provide these traders with the
incentive to shift trading to markets that do not impose such
restrictions. 1 14
Perhaps the most important reason why specialist trading im-
pedes market liquidity is because such trading prevents other mar-
ket professionals from making secondary trading markets that rival
the markets made by the specialists. For stocks that are subject to
the exchange's off-board trading restrictions, 1 5 broker-dealers who
are members of the exchange on which securities are listed are pro-
108 NYSE GUIDE, supra note 76, para. 104A.
109 BRADY REPORT, supra note 2, at 49.
110 A. ARBEL & A. KAFF, supra note 89, at 63-65; Harris, supra note 70.
1I NYSE GUIDE, supra note 76, rules 80A and 80B, para. 2080A-2080B.
112 Report of the Special Study of the Securities Markets of the SEC, H.R. Doc. No.
95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (pt. 2) at 57 (1963).
113 Harris, supra note 70, at 12; see also Cutner v. Fried, 373 F. Supp. 4 (S.D.N.Y.
1974) (allegation that specialist wrongfully suspended trading in the stock to which he
was assigned in violation of obligation to maintain a "fair and orderly market"); Lee,
supra note 12, at 42, cols. 1 & 5.
114 See Macey & Haddock, supra note 1, at 347-51.
115 See id. at 329; Poser, supra note 5, at 931.
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hibited by SEC rule from serving as competing market makers. 1 6
Since virtually all major broker-dealers are members of the NYSE,
these rules prevent the emergence of competition among rival mar-
ket makers for exchange listed securities and "deprive the securities
markets of the benefits that might otherwise accrue from enhance-
ment of competition among market makers and the commitment of
additional capital and professional skill to the market making
function." 117
Finally, as the following section shows, there is a clear conflict
between the exchange's efforts to provide investors with enhanced
monitoring of trading activities, and the specialist's function as a
market maker.
B. Monitoring on the NYSE
The Exchange itself is quick to point out that "[o]ne of the
greatest strengths of the NYSE... is its openness." 118 The fact that
trading on fixed-location exchanges such as the NYSE "is conducted
in the full view of the public" 19 greatly facilitates monitoring of ex-
change listed securities. This valuable aspect of exchange trading is
reinforced by continuous computerized instantaneous surveillance
of transactions on the trading floor. To this end, the NYSE main-
tains an on-line surveillance system, known as Stock Watch, which
monitors every trade that occurs on the Exchange and isolates
deviations from a stock's normal trading pattern for further
investigation. 20
Such monitoring is valuable to investors who want to prevent
certain types of insider trading.' 2 1 In addition, exchange monitor-
ing is of value because it reduces the incidence of share price manip-
ulation by market professionals.' 22 This sort of manipulation is
more difficult to detect than insider trading. Insider trading can be
detected by observing large or unusual trading patterns immedi-
ately prior to the public announcement of a meaningful corporate
event. By contrast, market manipulation by market professionals re-
flects the more subtle problems involved when such professionals
execute orders on behalf of customers. In particular, small inves-
tors often are at a disadvantage relative to large traders in terms of
speed of order execution. 123
116 See Macey & Haddock, supra note 1, at 335.
117 41 Fed. Reg. 4511 (1976).
118 NYSE ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 63, at 19.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 26.
121 See supra text accompanying notes 47-50.
122 Macey & Haddock, supra note 1, at 345-47.
123 BRADY REPORT, supra note 2, at 47.
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Clearly, when market professionals see purchase orders in a de-
clining market, such market professionals have an incentive to fill
those orders from their own inventories, rather than to fill them on
the basis of customers' sell orders. Other violations are even more
difficult to detect. A recent case, Weseley v. Spear, Leeds & Kellogg,124
provides an example of a market professional's conflict of interest
between his desire to make trading profits (or to avoid trading
losses) and his duties to clients. In that case, the defendant was the
specialist firm responsible forJ.P. Morgan stock. The price of Mor-
gan's common stock had fallen from $41.62 per share to $27.75 on
October 19, 1987. Prior to the opening on October 20, the plaintiff
alleged that he placed a market order to purchase 2,000 shares of
the stock and that the defendant executed this order along with
those of other purchasers totalling 500,000 shares. The defendant
set an opening price of $47 per share at which price he allegedly
sold a substantial amount of the 500,000-share block from his own
account. Two and one-half hours later the price dropped to $29
and it closed that day at $34.25.
Such overreaching is exceedingly difficult to detect even in the
open environment of a securities exchange. The obvious candidates
to serve as the monitors for market manipulation by market profes-
sionals are the exchange specialists who are required to continually
monitor their respective specialist posts. Clearly, however, the spe-
cialist's ability to take positions in the shares reduces his ability to
serve as monitor. During the time when specialists were an impor-
tant source of market liquidity, perhaps this was a trade-off worth
making. But under current market conditions, where an abundance
of market participants fulfills the market maker functions for ex-
change listed stocks, the specialists' ability to make markets in their
stocks conflicts with their ability to serve as impartial monitors.
The inability of exchange specialists to serve as an effective
monitor for transactions in listed securities presents little problem
for investors, however, because a number of substitute monitors for
specialist firms have emerged. In particular, SEC Rule lOb-5, which
outlaws manipulative and deceptive practices, and allows for a pri-
vate cause of action, provides an incentive for private plaintiffs-and
the attorneys representing them-to bring lawsuits alleging that
their agents did not faithfully execute trading instructions. 125 Inter-
estingly, much of the litigation brought against specialists' activities
on American stock exchanges involves violations of Rule lOb-5,
rather than violations of the specialists' duty to maintain a fair and
124 711 F. Supp. 713 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
125 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1989).
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orderly market.1 26 This reinforces the point made earlier that the
specialist's obligation to maintain a fair and orderly market is insuffi-
ciently precise to be of much value to market participants.
In addition to Rule lOb-5, sections 16(a) and 16(b) of the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934 significantly reduce the need for
monitoring exchange transactions. 127 Section 16(a) requires of-
ficers, directors and ten percent shareholders to report all trades
with the SEC, and section 16(b) requires such statutorily defined
insiders to disgorge any "short swing" trading profits made on se-
curities transactions consummated within a six month period.
Finally, as described above, the NYSE runs an automated stock
watch program that is wholly independent of the specialists. 28 This
program is particularly necessary in light of the conflicts of interest
facing specialists. Indeed, over-reaching by specialists is of particu-
lar concern to those administering the NYSE's stock watch
program.129
As technology has developed, stock traded on electronic ex-
changes such as NASDAQ can now be monitored with the same
level of exactitude available for exchange listed stock. As the SEC
has observed, "it is unclear that over-the-counter transactions are
intrinsically more difficult to monitor than exchange transac-
tions."' 0 The National Association of Securities Dealers has a
Market Surveillance Department that performs the same function as
the NYSE's stock watch program. Under the NASD's internal rules,
all transactions executed over-the-counter must be reported
through the organization's transaction reporting system.' s ' The
126 E.g., Schonholtz v. American Stock Exchange, 505 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1974) (in-
vestor brought action against a specialist, among others, alleging violations of rule 10(b)
and other exchange rules); United States v. Re, 336 F.2d 306 (2d Gir. 1964) (The Res,
along with others, were convicted under Rule 10(b) for manipulation of stock prices
while acting in the role of what they claimed to be specialists. On appeal the court held
that inherent in the jury's finding of guilty was the determination that the Res were not
performing the function of specialists in their dealings), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 904 (1964);
Weseley, 711 F. Supp. 713 (action brought under Rule 10(b) alleging that the defendant
specialist had artificially inflated the opening price of common stock in which he special-
ized); Cutner v. Fried, 373 F. Supp. 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (action was brought against regis-
tered specialist who allegedly wrongfully suspended trading in stock. The court held
that it was necessary for plaintiff to show causal link between defendant's acts and re-
duced trading of the stock and each member of the plaintiff class must show nexus be-
tween wrong and his loss); see also Note, The Downstairs Insider: The Specialist and Rule 10b-
5, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 695, 708 (1967) (advocating the use of Rule 10b-5 against
specialists).
127 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) & (b) (1988).
128 See supra text accompanying note 53.
129 Interviews with various NYSE officials (March 8, 1989).
130 Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11,942, 41 Fed. Reg. 4507, 4512 (1976).
131 Hearings of the Securities Trading Commission on Off-Board Trading Restric-
tions 9 (August 16, 1977) (Statement of Gordon S. Macklin, President of the National
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SEC serves as an additional independent monitor for all securities
transactions. 132
The NASD also has promulgated a complex set of regulations
that governs the conduct of market professionals who consummate
securities transactions on behalf of customers. According to these
rules, stock transactions must be "suitable" for investors, and such
transactions must conform to a five percent mark-up policy to pre-
vent over-reaching by brokers. 133
In addition, the marketplace has generated several additional
sources of monitoring for secondary market traders. 134 Prominent
among these market mechanisms are the market for corporate con-
trol, which monitors managerial divergence from corporate strate-
gies that maximize wealth for shareholders, and corporate rating
agencies, such as Moody's and Standard and Poor's, which provide
an independent assessment of the ability of corporate borrowers to
meet cash flow obligations on fixed debt and preferred equity.' 3 5
While this information is particularly valuable to bondholders and
other fixed debt and preferred equity claimants, it also is useful to
common equity claimants, who would like an independent assess-
ment of the cash flow position of the firms with which they deal.
While these sorts of monitoring mechanisms focus more on the
behavior of internal corporate officials than on that of market pro-
fessionals, market mechanisms also provide incentives for monitor-
ing of such professionals. As discussed above, investment bankers
have an incentive to develop and maintain reputations as providers
of liquidity in order to attract new underwriting business. For the
same reason, these investment bankers have an incentive to develop
and maintain reputations for fair dealing in stock trading activities.
It is extremely unlikely that the short term gains from even a large
one-time fraud in the trading markets could produce gains for in-
vestment bankers that equal the value of the reputations for trading
integrity that such firms have developed over time.
Thus, while the NYSE provides monitoring for exchange-listed
securities, an incredibly rich array of rival monitors has emerged.
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.); National Association of Securities Dealers Man-
ual (CGH), para. 1919 (1988) (rules describe when and how to report over-the-counter
transactions) [hereinafter NASD Manual].
132 Macey & Haddock, supra note 1, at 346.
133 NASD Manual, supra note 131, para. 2154; see also Merritt, Vickers, Inc., v. SEC,
353 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1965).
134 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Managers' Discretion and Investors' Welfare: Theories and
Evidence, 9 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 540 (1984); Frank H. Easterbrook, Two Agency-Cost Explana-
tions of Dividends, 74 AM. EcoN. REv. 650 (1984).
135 See generally S. TINIC & R. WEsT, supra note 40, at 357-59; Note, What Standard of
Care Should Govern the World's Shortest Editorials? An Economic Approach to Bond Rating Agency
Liability, 75 CoRNELL L. REv. 411 (1990) (authored by Gregory Husisian).
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These monitors prevent the NYSE from exercising any degree of
market power over potential listing firms who want to provide inves-
tors with assurances that their activities will be monitored.
C. The Provision of Off-The-Rack Rules by the NYSE
In no aspect of the exchange's business has the emergence of
close substitutes so profoundly displaced the traditional function of
the exchanges as in the provision of off-the-rack rules. First and
foremost, every state is involved in vigorous competition to produce
attractive, off-the-rack legal rules in order to attract chartering busi-
ness from incorporating firms.1 -6 In addition, Congress, the SEC
and the NASD have promulgated rules governing changes in corpo-
rate control, proxy contests, and public offerings of securities, all of
which are designed to protect investors to some degree. Independ-
ent organizations such as the American Law Institute, which has
sponsored an elaborate project on corporate governance, and the
ABA's Committee on Corporate Laws, which promulgates the
Model Business Corporations Act, are also valuable, and free,
sources of off-the-rack legal rules for corporations.
In light of the increasing complexity of corporate life, a final
and extremely significant source of legal rules for corporations is
the judiciary of the various states. State judiciaries apply and en-
force the implicit contracts between a firm's shareholders and its
managers. Because it is impossible for shareholders and managers
to specify ex ante all of the various contingencies that might arise in
the future, the judiciary serves the valuable role of interpreting the
various functions and responsibilities of corporate officers and di-
rectors in light of unforeseen circumstances. Thus state-law judges
are said to interpret hypothetical, implicit contracts between the
shareholders and the management of publicly held firms. These im-
plicit contracts that judges enforce take the form of the hypothetical
duties of care and loyalty that corporate officers and directors owe
their shareholders.13 7 Judges have interpreted these fiduciary duties
to mean that officers and directors must conduct the affairs of the
corporation so as to maximize value for shareholders.1 3 8 These
judge-made rules are of particular importance to shareholders be-
cause they constrain management in areas where it would be ex-
tremely costly for shareholders to control via intra-firm contract.
136 See Barry D. Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, The Role of Corporate Law in the Theory of
the Firm, 28J.L. & ECON. 179 (1985); Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the
Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. EcoN. & ORGANIZATION 225 (1985); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State
Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6J. LEGAL STuD. 251 (1977).
137 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91
YALE L.J. 698, 700-02 (1982).
138 Id.
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Clearly, it is not feasible for shareholders to draft intra-firm agree-
ments that are sufficiently detailed and complex to cover every fu-
ture contingency. The judiciary mitigates this contracting problem
by enforcing fiduciary duties of care and loyalty on management.
The immense resources, experience and expertise of the judici-
ary would be very costly for exchanges to replicate. Thus it seems
clear that legal rules in the form of state statutes, judge-made laws
and federal regulations have completely displaced the role of the
exchanges as providers of standard form, off-the-rack legal rules.
The Exchange's inability to compete with local and federal
agencies as a provider of internal corporate rules was particularly
evident in the recent controversy over intra-firm voting rules. His-
torically, the NYSE had a policy of refusing to list the securities of
firms that did not adhere to the Exchange's rule forbidding firms
from issuing more than one class of common stock with voting privi-
leges.13 9 When several listed firms moved to issue additional classes
of common shares with voting privileges, the NYSE declined to ap-
ply its long-standing rule. First it declared a moratorium on en-
forcement, and later successfully lobbied the SEC for the adoption
of a new Rule (19c-4), which nullifies certain aspects of the NYSE's
rule, and extends the application of other aspects to the NASD and
the American Stock Exchange. 40
With the adoption of Rule 19c-4, the NYSE effectively aban-
doned its role as an independent source of rules for listing firms.
For one thing, the NYSE's remaining rules in the area of corporate
governance are virtually nonexistent. As George Benston and
George Stigler have observed, the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 simply codified existing NYSE cus-
toms and practices. 141 As such, the SEC displaced the Exchange as
a source of rules of corporate governance.
But even if the NYSE were to attempt to re-enter the competi-
tion to promulgate rules of corporate governance, the Exchange
now completely lacks credibility as a result of the 19c-4 controversy.
During that unfortunate episode, it abandoned its voting rule under
pressure from the very firms to whom the rule was supposed to ap-
ply. 142 Thus shareholders of listing firms cannot be sure that the
NYSE would agree to enforce its few remaining rules.
139 See Fischel, supra note 39, at 120.
140 17 C.F.R. 240.19c-4 (1989); see also Jeffrey N. Gordon, Ties That Bond. Dual Class
Common Stock and the Problem of Shareholder Choice, 76 CALuF. L. REv. 1 (1988).
141 George J. Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63 AM. EcON. REv. 132, 133 (1973); George J. Stigler,
Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, 37J. Bus. 117 (1964).
142 Gordon, supra note 140, at 5-7.
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D. The NYSE as Provider of Reputational Capital for Listing
Firms
Another important attribute of listing on the NYSE is the fact
that obtaining a listing confers prestige on the listing firm and en-
hances its reputation. Because it is costly for buyers to obtain,
interpret and verify information about the firms in which they may
want to invest, such investors will pay to have "reputational in-
termediaries" serve as a filter.143
For many years, the NYSE was the dominant provider of
reputational capital in the economy. Over time, however, the
NYSE's role as a purveyor of reputational capital has dissipated for a
number of reasons. First, as the legal and regulatory system has be-
come more complex, firms have obtained the services of other
reputational intermediaries such as accountants, lawyers, and invest-
ment bankers. When accountants audit financial documentation
such as annual reports, and lawyers review similar material such as
registration statements and proxy solicitation literature, they are not
only risking potential legal liability, they also are staking their own
reputations for good judgment and integrity on the decisions they
make. Even unknown issuers can obtain considerable prestige by
hiring the services of a "white shoe" law firm or a "big six" account-
ing firm, the price of whose services includes the value of the
reputational benefit conferred upon the unknown issuer. As noted
above, it is rational for investors to rely on these reputational in-
termediaries, because they have more to lose from the diminution in
their reputation than they have to gain from the proceeds from a
one-time fraud.
The above argument applies with particular force to the serv-
ices performed by investment bankers. As Gilson and Kraakman
have pointed out, unlike issuers, investment bankers have no incen-
tive to engage in one-shot frauds on investors:
In essence, the investment banker rents the issuer its reputation.
The investment banker represents to the market (to whom it, and
not the issuer, sells the security) that it has evaluated the issuer's
product and good faith and that it is prepared to stake its reputa-
tion on the value of [whatever the company is selling]. Moreover,
because the investment banker, unlike the issuer, is certain to be a
"repeat player" in the capital markets, there are no final period
problems to dampen the signal of value. 144
Thus lawyers, investment bankers, and accountants all serve as close
143 Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 17, at 618-21.
144 Id. at 620 (emphasis in original).
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substitutes for the services of the exchange in providing reputa-
tional capital.
The anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws also have caused
a diminution in the value of the NYSE as a provider of reputational
capital. Investors do not need such strong assurances of issuer qual-
ity when they know that they can recover damages for misstatements
or material omissions by corporate management. 145 In this regard,
Rule lOb-5 is a particularly forceful deterrent, but liability under the
Securities Act of 1933 also is a significant factor in reducing the de-
mand for independent monitoring by the NYSE. 146 The Securities
Act of 1933 requires issuers to file a registration statement with the
SEC in connection with any public offering of securities. 147 The Act
also permits those who purchase securities in public offerings to re-
cover against the principal executive and financial officers of the is-
suing firm, every person on the board of directors, every
underwriter of the securities, and every expert, including account-
ants, as to those portions of the registration statement for which
such experts were responsible. 148 Investors may recover where
there are any statements in the registration statement that are either
false or misleading, as well as for material omissions of facts that
should have been stated.149
Thus, any time a firm wants to send a highly credible signal that
its securities are valuable, it need only make a public offering of its
securities in the marketplace. As Judge Easterbrook has observed,
such an offering not only subjects issuers to potential liability under
the securities laws, it also subjects issuers to screening by invest-
ment bankers and other professional market intermediaries who
serve as monitors for the collective interests of the investing com-
munity. 150 Thus, we observe firms going to the capital market to
obtain funds far more often than would be necessary in the absence
of a need to assure investors that management is maximizing value
for shareholders. 15 1 These trips to the capital market are a direct
145 See, e.g., Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
146 See 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1988).
147 See id. § 77e(c).
148 See id. § 77k.
149 The only defense (and even this defense is not available to the issuer) to a cause
of action under this section of the Act is for those involved in the preparation of a regis-
tration statement to show that they performed an adequate due diligence investigation.
This requires defendants to establish that they performed a reasonable investigation
into the affairs of the issuer, and that they had reason to believe, and in fact did believe
that the registration statement was accurate and complete. See Escott v. Barchris Constr.
Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
150 Easterbrook, Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends, supra note 134, at 654.
151 Id.
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substitute for the services of the NYSE as a reputational
intermediary.
Still more substitutes for the NYSE's services as a reputational
intermediary come in the form of stock brokers, investment advis-
ers, and pension fund managers. These market professionals hold
themselves out to investors as experts at evaluating investments.
And, unlike the NYSE, these informational and reputational in-
termediaries provide a product that is custom-tailored to particular
investors. A listing on the NYSE only signals investors that a partic-
ular firm is big enough and financially sound enough to qualify for
such a listing. For a firm to be recommended by a reputable broker
or other intermediary, it must not only be financially sound, it
should also be the sort of investment that meets the particular needs
of the investor. This is a service that the NYSE does not offer.
Thus not only have substitutes emerged for the services of the
NYSE as a reputational intermediary, but the various anti-fraud pro-
visions of the Securities Laws have diminished investor demand for
ex ante bonded promises of value, such as that conveyed by having a
good reputation. The securities laws have provided strong reme-
dies ex post.
III
THE TOKYO STOCK EXCHANGE
Capital markets are becoming increasingly international. As
such, it is not surprising that many of the same factors that led to the
emergence of close substitutes for the services provided by the
NYSE also exist in Tokyo. For example, the market mechanisms by
which liquidity is provided are identical in both markets, in that the
same market forces that lead to liquidity on the NYSE also create
liquidity on the TSE. In particular, rivalrous competition among the
big four Japanese securities firms, both for brokerage revenues and
for underwriting profits, mirrors the competitive situation among
market professionals in the United States.
Despite the important similarities between the two exchanges,
we find that issuers and investors do not perceive that good substi-
tutes for the TSE yet exist. Consequently, demand for listing on the
TSE is far more inelastic than demand for listing on the NYSE.
There are important differences between the TSE and the
NYSE that may account for the difference between the competitive
environment faced by the NYSE on the one hand and the TSE on
the other. First, the function ostensibly served by the specialist
firms on the NYSE is conducted by the saitori member firms on the
TSE. Unlike the specialist firms in New York, however, the way in
which the saitori member firms serve to maintain fair and orderly
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markets is quite limited.' 52 In fact, they are accountable for execu-
tion of orders only, and are prohibited from taking positions in the
securities for which they are responsible. As we discuss below,'5 3
this regulation has certain benefits. In particular, it enables the
saitori member firms to serve as better monitors, and alleviates con-
fusion among market participants as to the source of market
liquidity.
Second, the over-the-counter market is far less developed in Ja-
pan than in the U.S., and there is yet no equivalent in size to the
automated quotation system provided by NASDAQ.M Article 191
of the Japanese Securities and Exchange Law ("JSEL"), 155 which
prohibits anyone from providing a forum that would be similar to an
exchange, has impeded the emergence of a trading market over the
counter. Thus issuers whose shares trade in the over-the-counter
market face higher transactions costs than firms whose shares trade
on the TSE.
Third, unlike the U.S., there is virtually no securities fraud liti-
gation in Japan.156 In particular, we see no cases of criminal prose-
cution or civil litigation for insider trading, even though the JSEL
has relevant provisions.157 Consequently, investors do not expect
to obtain ex post recovery for securities fraud or stock price manipu-
lation. It is therefore not surprising that Japanese investors have a
higher demand than U.S. investors for monitoring by the exchange
and the primary regulator, the Ministry of Finance ("MoF").
A. Liquidity on the TSE
There are three important differences between the rules on the
NYSE and the TSE that may affect the way in which liquidity for
listed stock is supplied. First, the trading system of the TSE is "or-
der driven" rather than "quotation driven." Order matching is un-
152 See infra text accompanying notes 160-66. It should be noted at the outset that
although Japanese saitori member firms are often said to be obliged to "maintain fair
and orderly markets," their obligations are quite different from those imposed upon
specialists on the NYSE.
153 See infra text accompanying notes 160-65.
154 See infra text accompanying notes 167-68.
155 Japanese Securities and Exchange Law, Law No. 25 of 1948,'as amended to
1988, reprinted in CAPITAL MARKETS RESEARCH INSTrrIUTE, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE LAW
(1988) [hereinafter JSEL].
156 For an exceptional but interesting case involving civil liability for fraud by a se-
curities firm in Japan, see infra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
157 See Article 58 ofJSEL, a counterpart of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 in the United States. Note that the rules on insider trading were strength-
ened substantially in the 1988 amendments. For example, a counterpart of Section
16(a) of the U.S. Securities Exchange Act was reintroduced as Article 188 of the JSEL.
See generally KAZUMI OKAMURA & CHIEKO TAKESHITA, LAws AND REGULATIONS RELATING
TO INSIDER TRADING IN JAPAN (1989).
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dertaken in accordance with the principles of price priority and time
priority. Member firms can negotiate deals "off-board," i.e., outside
the system, but off-board deals must be put through the system.' 58
This order-driven system mirrors the reality of stock trading, inas-
much as it enables the stock exchange to be a passive forum through
which a variety of professionals meet. 159
Second, on the TSE, the function ostensibly served by the spe-
cialist firms is conducted by the "saitori" member firms. There is,
however, an important difference between specialists and saitori
members. Saitori member firms, unlike "regular" member firms,
are prohibited from trading for their own account, not only on their
specialty stocks, but in any other listed stocks as well. 160 Conse-
quently, the saitori firms serve as pure "conduits," matching buy
and sell orders placed by regular member firms.
Regular member firms are represented by "trading clerks" and
saitori member firms are represented by "intermediary clerks" on
the trading floor. The intermediary clerk is obliged to enter the bid-
asked prices given by orders from the trading clerks in his book and
announce them to the crowd in an audible voice whenever necessary
to maintain a fair and orderly market. This duty of the saitori mem-
bers is important when there is a large and active crowd around the
trading post for a certain stock, and trading clerks are dealing ac-
tively among themselves rather than through the intermediary ser-
vice. In such circumstances, the intermediary clerk responsible for
the stock must represent the orders in his book so that traders who
have placed orders do not miss the market when it moves in the
appropriate direction for these orders. Aside from this extraordi-
nary situation, the intermediary clerk is obliged to announce the
bid-asked prices in his book when asked by a regular member.
158 Constitution of the Tokyo Stock Exchange, art. 23. Also, note the exception,
among others, that member firms may trade on another stock exchange.
159 See ToUCHE Ross MANAGEMENT CONSULTANTS, supra note 11, at 28 ("The absence
of a central limit order system has . . . led to a dependency on market-makers as the
source of liquidity."). Note that the NYSE trading system is quote-driven but limit or-
ders are placed on the specialists' books, while NASDAQdoes not have a formal central-
ized limit order system at all. The advantages and disadvantages of the order-driven and
quote-driven systems have been much discussed in the past. As far as liquidity is con-
cerned, however, the debate over which system is better is pointless unless one looks at
the reality in the market, where the rivalrous competition among professionals is the real
source of liquidity. The lack of a centralized limit order system, as in NASDAQ may
affect the monitoring functions by the organization in the sense that broker-dealers' con-
tractual obligations to their customers for trading become more important for monitor-
ing purposes.
160 See Constitution of the Tokyo Stock Exchange, art. 8, § 2; Business Regulations
of the Tokyo Stock Exchange, § 37. The description of the saitori system in the text is




An interesting question is whether the limit-order book should
be disclosed to the trading clerks on the floor. Unlike the NYSE, the
TSE has no rule that prohibits disclosure of the saitori's book. As a
result, trading clerks as well as Exchange employees can look at the
book, which is set on the counter of a trading post in front of the
intermediary clerk, and know from time to time how many shares
regular members are offering or bidding on the book at what prices.
Saitori members must record all transactions in their specialty
stocks in a trade report sheet, whether they are executed through
their intermediary service or directly between the regular members
in the crowd. 161 For this record-keeping purpose, the Exchange
rules oblige the selling member to report his trade to the saitori
member who handles the stock immediately after it is consummated
between the trading clerks in the crowd without intermediary ser-
vice. 162 The trade report sheets are collected and automatically
read through an Optical Character Reader on the floor of the ex-
change. The Reader produces the trade report sheets that are sent
to each regular member. Trading clerks must confirm their transac-
tions on those sheets. 163 After confirmation by the regular mem-
bers, the memory tapes of those transactions are sent to the
Exchange's wholly owned company for processing, clearing and set-
tlement of the contracts.
In our view, the saitori system described above has two advan-
tages over the NYSE Specialist system. First, this system alleviates
confusion among market participants as to the source of market li-
quidity. Indeed, the saitori system is structured in a way that puri-
fies the roles of regular member firms as liquidity suppliers. The
saitori system assures that pertinent information is disseminated to
regular member firms and the marketplace. There is intense com-
petition for trading profits among member firms, particularly among
the four big securities firms, 1' and this competition for trading
profits, combined with a desire to attract new underwriting business,
provides ample incentives for the securities firms to serve as a
source of liquidity.
Second, this system enables saitori member firms to serve as
better monitors, as well as to support the monitoring functions of
the exchange, the regulator and the market itself. Monitoring by
saitori members, the exchange and the regulator is facilitated by the
fact that, like the NYSE, the TSE is in a central physical location,
161 Business Regulations of the Tokyo Stock Exchange § 35.
162 Id § 22.
163 Id. § 24.




which, along with the reporting mechanism described above, lowers
search and transaction costs to traders, and enables saitori mem-
bers, the exchange and the regulator to oversee all trading.
Once the role of saitori member firms is properly identified,
one might well wonder whether their task could be done largely by
computer. Indeed this is exactly the case for infrequently traded
stocks on the TSE.165 Trading of these stocks is not conducted on
the floor. Rather, buy and sell orders are shown on a computer dis-
play screen so that the only task of the intermediary clerk is to press
the key to match orders and execute trades.16 6 Here, the role of
saitori members is simply to monitor trading patterns.
Finally, the third difference that exists between the U.S. and
Japanese systems relates to the over-the-counter securities markets.
Section 191 of the JSEL prohibits anyone from setting up a place
that would be "similar" to an exchange, 167 which resulted in a much
less developed over-the-counter market in Japan. Although various
efforts have been made to foster the over-the-counter market in Ja-
pan during past years, a customary understanding remains that the
over-the-counter market should be a market used by firms as a step
to future listing at a stock exchange.168
We cannot defend underdevelopment of the over-the-counter
market in Japan. Inasmuch as the competition among securities
firms is the primary source of secondary market liquidity, there is no
reason to thwart the development of the over-the-counter markets.
The question again is what is the best way to monitor the transac-
tions that take place in the over-the-counter market. The current
Japanese rules as well as the customary understanding generate
more costs than benefits in the market place.
165 TSE has a computer-aided system known as the Computer-Assisted Order Rout-
ing and Execution System ("CORES"). For the details of the system, see TSE PROFILE,
supra note 59, at 13-15. "[A]bout 1,540 issues out of 1,690 all listed domestic and all
foreign stocks are currently traded by [CORES, and] only the 150 most active domestic
stocks [are traded on the floor]." TSE FACT Boox, supra note 3, at 35.
166 Note, however, that the GORES is designed to execute orders automatically if
such orders are to be executed at the same price as the last traded price. In addition, an
intermediary clerk may give a narrow price range to CORES to enable the system to
execute a trade automatically within the range. See TSE PROFILE, supra note 59, at 14-15.
167 Article 191 ofJSEL reads: (1) No person shall open any facilities which are simi-
lar to a securities market. (2) No person shall effect any transaction set forth below on
any facilities referred to in the preceding paragraph: (i) buying or selling securities ......
Article 2(12) ofJSEL defines a "securities market" as "a market provided by a securities
exchange for trading, etc. in securities."
168 For a good description of the historical development and the current state of the
Japanese over-the-counter market, see TAKEJI YAMASHrrA, JAPAN'S SECURITIES MARKETS:
A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE 144-52 (1989).
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B. Monitoring on the Tokyo Stock Exchange
A great concern for investors in Japan as well as in the U.S., is
the effectiveness of stock manipulations and insider trading moni-
toring. Small investors are poorly equipped to detect fraudulent
transactions by market professionals. In Japan, investors rely heav-
ily on the stock exchanges to monitor trading in listed securities.
Indeed, there is only one reported case that involves civil liability for
fraud in this field inJapan. 16 9 In this case the plaintiff, who suffered
substantial loss from an alleged stock price manipulation by his bro-
kerage firms, unsuccessfully sued the TSE and the Osaka Stock Ex-
change for their failure to detect the alleged fraud and to take
corrective actions.
Unlike the U.S., Japan has virtually no history of civil litigation
over fraudulent transactions of market professionals despite compa-
rable statutory provisions that prohibit fraud on the stock market. 170
Consequently, Japanese investors have a particularly high demand
for ex ante monitoring by the exchanges and by the MoF. The TSE
has responded to this demand by offering computer-aided "stock
watch" programs, similar to the ones found in the U.S. Also, recent
revisions to insider trading regulations were immediately followed
by new TSE rules requiring listed firms to file important information
from time to time at the stock exchange. 17 1 And, the strong ties that
exist in Japan between the Exchange and the Ministry of Finance
enhance the Exchange's role as monitor.
The saitori member firms play an important role in the moni-
toring. Since saitori member firms are prohibited from trading in
any listed stocks, there are no conflicts of interest between their re-
sponsibilities to act as market makers and their obligations to act as
monitors of trading patterns on the Exchange. Rather, the saitori
system, which itself is carefully monitored by TSE floor clerks, can
effectively support monitoring activities of the exchange and the
regulator when combined with the trade information reporting sys-
tem as described earlier. 172
C. Provision of Off-the-Rack Rules by the TSE
Unlike the NYSE, the TSE has not developed off-the-rack legal
rules for use by its members. It should be noted, however, that
under the rules of the TSE, the Exchange requires listed companies,
169 Nojima v. Tokyo Stock Exchange, 1020 Hanrei Jiho 129 (Tokyo District Court
Judgment, April 27, 1981).
170 See, e.g.,JSEL, Articles 58, 125-27.
171 Kubo, KaishaJoho no Tekiji Kaiji to Fairingu Seido (Timely Disclosure of Cor-
porate Information and the Filing System), 1176 Shoji Homu 2 (1989) (in Japanese).
172 See supra text accompanying notes 161-63.
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as a condition of remaining listed, to give immediate notice to the
Exchange whenever anything occurs having an important effect on
the company's management and whenever any important corporate
decision is made.' 73 The principal items considered "important"
are illustrated in the rules. ' 74 Specifically, important effects on man-
agement include but are not limited to dishonor of a promissory
note or check, the commencement of bankruptcy or corporate reor-
ganization procedure, suspension of business and the drastic change
of the nature of the company's business. Corporate decisions that
are considered important include the issuance of new stock or divi-
dends, the reduction of capital, merger with another firm, consolida-
tion or split of shares, a change in par value, and a change in the
class of stock.' 75 In addition, the Exchange may ask listed compa-
nies to furnish it with pertinent information or to submit documents
to it "when it is deemed necessary."' 176
These general rules enable the TSE to exercise broad supervi-
sory powers when necessary to "represent" public investors. This
offers an ex ante counterpart to the U.S. enforcement of fiduciary
rules under state corporation laws, which are dormant in practice in
Japan. Recalling that litigation in Japan is scarce, it is likely that the
demand for listing on the TSE is strong because it is difficult for
investors to find ex ante substitutes outside the exchange.
D. The TSE as Provider of Reputational Capital for Listing
Firms
In Japan, issuing firms strongly prefer to be listed on the TSE.
Japanese lawyers, accounting firms, rating agencies, and investment
bankers may not really be independent of issuing firms in the way
they are in the United States. Consequently, such firms do not pro-
vide dose substitutes for the TSE's role as a reputational intermedi-
ary. More importantly, the strong ties between the TSE and the
prestigious Ministry of Finance greatly contribute to the prestige en-
joyed by listing firms in Japan. Little experience of ex post enforce-
ment of the Japanese counterparts of U.S. anti-fraud provisions
enhances the investors' demand for ex ante signalling about issuing
firms.
Another important distinction between the TSE and the NYSE
enhances the TSE's role as a reputational intermediary for listing
firms relative to that of the NYSE. While the NYSE's listing stan-
173 Tokyo Stock Exchange, Regulations on the Reporting by the Issuers of the
Listed Stocks (July 1, 1971, as amended).





dards represent both necessary and sufficient conditions for becom-
ing listed on that exchange, the TSE's listing criteria state only the
minimum requirements necessary to apply for a listing. After a firm
completes its application, the TSE conducts a thorough examination
of the candidate company's financial stability, profitability, manage-
ment quality, and competitive position. TSE employees interview
employees of the applicant company, and conduct an extensive doc-
ument review. The examination is considered very strict, and "it is
inconceivable that a company which barely satisfies the 'listing crite-
rion' [would be] admitted for listing."1 77
CONCLUSION
In this Article, we have defined more precisely the product that
organized stock exchanges provide to the listing companies who are
their clients. To do this, we unbundled the product offered by such
exchanges into four component parts and analyzed each part sepa-
rately. These component parts include: (1) providing liquidity to
investors, (2) monitoring fraud such as insider trading and stock
price manipulation by market professionals, (3) offering off-the-rack
legal rules that reduce the costs of contracting within the firm, and
(4) serving as a reputational intermediary.
We then analyzed each of these component parts of the opera-
tions of the NYSE and the TSE. We have shown that liquidity on
both exchanges results from each exchange stimulating an auction
market in which market professionals and other information proces-
sors can meet and exchange information about a firm's value by
buying and selling shares. The exchanges provide a centralized lo-
cation that' facilitates information production and dissemination,
and rivalrous competition among market professionals.
It is generally thought that exchange specialists provide liquid-
ity to firms whose shares are listed on the NYSE. We have shown
that this is, in fact, not the case. Specialists can do little to provide
liquidity in modem securities markets dominated by institutional in-
vestors, block trading, and the operation of dynamic hedging strate-
gies such as portfolio insurance.
On the TSE, the function ostensibly performed by specialists is
performed by the four saitori member firms. We have argued that,
in modem trading markets, neither specialists nor saitori members
should be expected to provide liquidity for the secondary trading
markets; rather, the securities firms who are exchange members
177 Memorandum of Mitsuhiro Hasegawa, Johnson Graduate School of Management




provide liquidity. Despite the realities of modem corporate finance,
which make it impossible for single firms to provide liquidity to the
marketplace as a whole, both the SEC and the NYSE seek to perpet-
uate the myth that exchange specialists are the source of secondary
market liquidity for listed stocks. By contrast, we view the rules of
the TSE as far more realistic in that there are no legal or regulatory
expectations that saitori members will provide market liquidity. In-
stead, rivalrous competition among exchange members, particularly
the "big four"-Daiwa, Nikko, Nomura, and Yamaiichi-serves the
function ostensibly allocated to exchange specialists on the NYSE.
We have shown that trading profits for these firms, in combination
with a desire to build and maintain the reputational capital neces-
sary to attract new underwriting business, provide these firms with
sufficient incentives to maintain fair and orderly secondary trading
markets. By contrast, the exchange specialists lack the capital and
the economic incentives to provide secondary market liquidity.
Thus we have found that like the TSE, secondary market liquidity is
in fact provided by the major trading firms on the NYSE. We pre-
dict that over time competitive pressure will cause the exchange spe-
cialist system to evolve into a function very similar to that played by
saitori member firms. In particular, we have argued that because
saitori member firms do not take positions in the issues they over-
see, they do not have the same conflicts of interest that prevent ex-
change specialists from serving as effective monitors of trading
activity.
We also have observed that the market processes by which li-
quidity is provided on both the TSE and the NYSE are identical to
the processes by which liquidity is provided in the over-the-counter
market in the U.S. Indeed, the computer linkages provided by NAS-
DAQ have transformed the U.S. over-the-counter market into an
electronically linked exchange. As such, from the perspective of a
firm considering whether to list its securities on the NYSE, the over-
the-counter market provides a close substitute for an exchange.
The absence of a highly developed over-the-counter market in
Japan creates a greater demand for TSE listings by Japanese
companies.
The second economic function served by the organized stock
exchanges is a monitoring function. Firms whose shares are listed
on both exchanges are subject to oversight in the form of so-called
"stock watch" programs designed to uncover instances of insider
trading and market manipulation. While these services are of real
value to investors, we have argued that the securities laws of both
countries are performing similar services that traditionally were per-
formed by the exchanges. In addition, advances in computer tech-
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nology make it possible for exchange transactions to be monitored
in the over-the-counter securities markets as easily as they are moni-
tored on the floor of an exchange. Once again, however, there ap-
pear to be close substitutes for listing on the NYSE that do not exist
for firms considering listing on the TSE. In particular, the ample
litigation opportunities for Americans allow investors to recover
losses from fraud and stock price manipulation, and reduce the de-
mand for monitoring by the NYSE. In addition, U.S. firms can ob-
tain monitoring from independent accountants, independent
investment bankers and lawyers in the process of going public more
easily than Japanese firms because these informational in-
termediaries are more independent of issuers in the U.S. than in
Japan.
The third service traditionally offered by stock exchanges has
been the provision of convenient, standard form off-the-rack rules
for listed firms. These off-the-rack rules greatly reduced the costs of
transacting for listed firms, and were clearly of value at one time. As
with the monitoring function provided by the NYSE, however, other
providers of this service have emerged. In particular, state legisla-
tures provide off-the-rack rules in connection with their chartering
function, and the SEC promulgates such rules in connection with
their administration of the various federal securities laws. InJapan,
the MoF provides an oversight role that complements the role
played by the TSE.
A final service traditionally offered by the NYSE is the provision
of reputational capital for listing firms. In the past, an exchange
listing was of value to the listing firm because it provided a signal of
quality to other market participants who may have had poor access
to alternative sources of data. The technology revolution has
changed this situation dramatically. Now market participants can"
obtain easy access to current information about issuing firms
through a variety of publications and data base services. In addi-
tion, rating agencies provide a signalling function to issuing firms
that clearly rivals the signalling function provided by the exchanges.
Finally, issuing firms who are attempting to signal the market that
they are of high quality can hire law firms, accounting firms, com-
mercial banks and investment banks who enjoy significant interna-
tional reputations. By hiring such financial and informational
intermediaries, issuing firms convey to the market a signal of high
quality.
Finally, the process of going public requires issuing firms to
register their securities with the Ministry of Finance or the SEC, and
to comply with a wide variety of rules and regulations. And all firms
with publicly traded stock are subject to the anti-fraud provisions of
1990] 1051
1052 CORNELL LA W REVIEW [Vol. 75:1007
the securities laws, including Rule lOb-5. The presence of this regu-
latory regime diminishes the market's demand for reputational sig-
nalling because breaches of trust can be more effectively monitored
expost through the legal system, alleviating the demand for monitor-
ing ex ante.
For all of these reasons, market demand for the listing services
of the organized stock exchanges, which traditionally was quite in-
elastic, has diminished considerably. In particular, the rise of the
modern securities firm, which provides both liquidity and reputa-
tional signalling for client firms, has diminished the market demand
for the organized exchanges. Any regulatory reform without the
proper recognition of today's functions of organized stock ex-
changes would thus easily be misdirected.
